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INTRODUCTION

It is inescapable: there is a presumption in favor of preemption. Historically,
the Supreme Court has said differently-that, rather, there is a presumption against
preemption. There is no such presumption any longer, if, indeed, there ever really
was one. Preemption doctrine has been exceedingly puzzling in the last decade, but
when one recognizes that the Court's doctrine not only favors preemption, but
presumes it, preemption doctrine is not a puzzle at all.
Preemption doctrine is the judicial tool by which courts define the contours of
federal control of a subject when Congress has legislated pursuant to one of its
enumerated powers. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution defines the
constitutional principle that federal law is supreme.' Preemption doctrine gives
content to the parameters of that principle in areas left in doubt under particular
federal legislation, and there inevitably will be areas of doubt.
The purpose ofpreemption doctrine, therefore, is to define the sphere of control
between federal and state law when they conflict, or appear to conflict. The pieces
of the preemption puzzle are very familiar: a piece of federal legislation; an
administrative body given authority to enforce, and, perhaps to further define, the
legislation; a concurrent state law or regulation that would seem also to operate in
the same sphere as the federal legislation; and a party who wants to enforce the state
regulation and ignore the federal, opposed by another party who wants to obey only
the federal law, and not the state law. There are many ways to fit these pieces
together, and many variables to consider in the process.
One such variable has historically been the supposed presumption against the
preemption of state regulation in the area of traditional police power-those
governing the life, health, and safety of the general public.2 Most commentators
favor such a presumption as consistent with federalist notions of limited federal
government.3 The Supreme Court has mentioned such a presumption often in the

1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
2. This "presumption" was articulated very early in the life of preemption jurisprudence. See,
e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 156 n.1 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing
various Supreme Court opinions). The modem statement of the presumption is usually traced to Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). On the presumption against preemption see
generally Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-emption
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 1379 (1998) (exploring the presumption against
preemption and noting its ineffectiveness).
3. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290-91 (2000); Raeker-Jordan, supra note
2, at 1428-29. But see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000)
(criticizing the presumption against preemption).

For articles exploring preemption doctrine generally, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption,79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994); Betsy J. Grey, Make CongressSpeak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and
Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69 (1988). On preemption principles as
applied to products liability actions specifically, see Richard C. Ausness, FederalPreemptionofState
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one hundred plus years it has been concentrating on this doctrine. When Congress
legislates in a field within its enumerated powers, typically under the Commerce
Clause, courts must determine how much state law has been displaced in the
process. Consequently, preemption doctrine is central to the definition ofpower and
control under our federal system of government.'
Preemption cases, at one level, then are about the specific subject matter of the
legislation in issue, and how Congress has chosen to legislate in that field. Recent
preemption cases in the products liability field have involved cigarette labeling,5
railroad crossing warnings, 6 medical device marketing, 7 and air bags.' The Court
has decided a significantnumber ofpreemption cases inthe last decade, particularly
involving products liability,9 and is poised to decide more in the coming years.1
On a more basic level, though, preemption is about power and politics because
it involves the fundamental balance of Congress's power in relation to the states.
It is a doctrine full of complexity borne of the enormity of the task with which it is
charged. To the extent that the Supreme Court has something to say about the
power struggle of federalism, it speaks, partially at least, through its preemption
decisions.
A definition of the terminology of preemption may be in order. Preemption
doctrine begins with the Supremacy Clause which defines federal law to be
supreme. The scope of federal legislation is within the power of Congress to define,
and ifCongress does not want federal law to be supreme in any particular area, then
it is not. So, preemption doctrine seeks Congress's intent on the scope of

ProductsLiabilityDoctrines,44 S.C.L. REv. 187 (1993).
4. It has been said that preemption doctrine is the most frequently used constitutional law
doctrine. Gardbaum, supra note 3, at 768.
5. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (involving preemptive effect of federal
cigarette labeling statutes).
6. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (involving preemptive effect of federal
railroad grade crossing warning regulations).
7. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (involving preemptive effect of Medical Device
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
8. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (involving preemptive effect of
National Highway Traffic and Safety Act regulations regarding air bag use in automobiles).
9. A search by the author of preemption cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1940
disclosed approximately 150 decided between 1940 and 1980 and an additional 150 in the twenty
years between 1980 and 2000, roughly double the amount of the previous forty years.
Until the 1990s, the Court had decided only a handful of cases involving preemption of common
law damages actions. E.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), discussed infra
notes 145-74 and accompanying text, and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959), discussed infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
Between 1990 and 2001, the Court decided five preemption cases involving products liability
actions alone: Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier,529 U.S. 861;
Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470; Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995); Cipollone,505 U.S.
504. During the same time period, the Court also decided two cases involving preemption of tort
actions stemming from railroad accidents: Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000);
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
10. The Court ill hear another products liability preemption case in its 2002-2003 term.
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 757 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2001), cert.granted,122 S.Ct. 917 (2002) (mem.).
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displacement of state law. If Congress has included an express preemption
provision in a statute addressed to the matter of the legislation's scope, that
provision must be interpreted. In the absence of an express preemption provision,
the Court must determine Congress's intent to preempt implicitly. Three categories
of implied preemption are typically utilized: (1) occupation of the field implied
preemption, where Congress's legislation is so complete, and the area is one
requiring national uniformity of regulation, that Congress can be said to have
intended to occupy the field; (2) implied conflict preemption, where the federal and
state regulations are in such conflict that state law must yield to the federal because
either (a) there is an actual conflict in that it is impossible for a party to comply with
both federal and state regulation or (b) state law "stands as an obstacle" to the
accomplishment of federal objectives and, therefore, must yield.' Use of the lastmentioned implied preemption doctrine known as "obstacle" preemption causes the
most doctrinal difficulty because of the inherent uncertainty in determining
Congress's intent to preempt based on an ex post judicial assessment of
congressional objectives. 2
The temptation is very strong to explain the Court's preemption doctrine by an
assessment of the Justices' political or philosophical beliefs about the scope of
federal legislation and how it should be interpreted. 3 After a review of the Court's
decisions over the last century, it will be difficult to resist that temptation. This
Article attempts to explain trends in preemption doctrine by another method:
chronicling the shifts in the Court's preemption doctrine historically. Such an
historical treatment serves to illuminate the forces that have operated on the
doctrine and, perhaps, enable a prediction of where it may be headed.
11. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
61 (1941). See generally Nelson, supra note 3, at 226-29 (discussing the Court's analysis of
preemption doctrine); Raeker-Jordan, supranote 2, at 1382-1384 (same).

12. See Nelson, supranote 3, at 277. In discussing obstacle preemption, Professor Caleb Nelson
stated the following:

When a federal statute does not expressly address preemption, it is quite
possible that members of Congress did not even consider preemption, or at least
did not reach any actual collective agreement about how much state law to
displace. To the extent the Court is talking about subjective intent at all, the
Court appears to be conducting an exercise in "imaginative reconstruction":
The Court is trying to reconstruct how the enacting Congress would have
resolved questions about the statute's preemptive effect if it had considered them

long enough to come to a collective agreement.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13. See David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
PreemptionJurisprudence: A QuantitativeAnalysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (1999) ("For most
judges, whether liberal or conservative, these cases pit one dimension of their ideology, their
principles of federalism, against another, their policy preferences or attitudes toward the particular
local regulation at issue."). Others have observed the unusual alliances borne of preemption doctrine.

See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 3, at 229 ("In recent years, conservative advocates of federalism and
liberal advocates ofgovernment regulation havejoined in arguing that the current tests forpreemption
risk displacing too much state law. This alliance is not as odd as it might seem, because the politics
of preemption are complicated.") (footnotes omitted).

2002]

UNMASKING THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PREEMPTION

971

This historical treatment reveals a preemption doctrine that has evolved over
the last century from one based on an assumption of congressional legislative
exclusivity and almost certain preemption of state regulation to a doctrine, in the
mid-part of the century, based on a search for congressional intent to preempt so
that state laws, particularly those based on historical police powers, were not
needlessly displaced. This effort to discern congressional intent to preempt has
been, at least facially, paramount such that the Court, for a short time, relied on
express preemption provisions to the exclusion of attempts to discern implicit
congressional intent. The effort to discern congressional intent to preempt has fallen
by the wayside, however, and the Court's preemption doctrine has reverted to its
early-twentieth century focus on federal exclusivity, but, this time, in the guise of
implied obstacle preemption.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court's recent preemption decisions
compel the conclusion that the Court's preemption analysis has, in effect, created
a presumption infavor ofpreemption, contrary to the Court's oft-quoted dicta that
there is a presumption againstpreemption of historic state police powers. Indeed,
there is no presumption against preemption: the Court has found preemption of
state law tort actions when Congress has, in no uncertain terms, expressly stated the
contrary. Express preemption provisions, today, are read narrowly; implied
preemption doctrine is applied broadly against the silent backdrop of presumed
preemptive intent.
Part II of this Article provides a history of the Court's primary preemption
cases since the early part of the twentieth century, focusing on the way in which the
doctrine has evolved and opining about the reasons for the evolutionary shifts as
they occurred. The application of preemption doctrine to common law damages
actions is highlighted given the particular difficulty the Court has had with such
cases and the importance that preemption of such actions has to products liability
matters.
Part III takes preemption doctrine into the twenty-first century by first
explaining the Court's most recent struggles with preemption's focus on
congressional intent. Part III explores how the Court has resolved that struggle, by
refocusing on implied preemption with a presumption in favor of preemption.
Further, this Part summarizes the Court's preemption doctrine and makes clear that
the Court's modem preemption doctrine looks very much like its early preemption
doctrine, which broadly presumed preemption when it suited the Court to do so.
Part IV explains the current preemption doctrine, applying the presumption in
favor of preemption, and seeks to justify it. Without agreeing that the current
doctrine strikes the proper balance between congressional and state control over the
historic police powers, this Part explains the benefits that may ensue from having
abroadly applied preemption doctrine. Clarity of doctrine, ease of application, and
certainty of result all increase efficiency in the operation of the legal system.
Compensation of injured tort claimants, in the case ofproducts liability preemption,
will surely decrease as liability is preempted. When compensation decreases not
only is the victim irretrievably affected, the tortfeasor's incentive to modify its
tortious behavior is significantly lessened to the extent that tort liability motivates
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behavior. Clarifying this result of preemption doctrine may enable legislators to
4
confront directly the effect of their legislation under the Court's doctrine.'
Congress will be able to see, if it chooses, the effect of the Court's preemption
doctrine without the shroud of veiled attempts to discern congressional intent.
Part V uses a federal regulatory scheme that the Court has not yet analyzed
under the current preemption doctrine to illustrate how the Court's preemption
doctrine may apply to it. The federal Boat Safety Act has been the subject of a
number of lower court preemption cases in recent years and is poised to be the next
victim of the Court's presumption in favor of preemption.
Many have called for Congress to speak its intent to preempt clearly;' 5 I join
that chorus but with no anticipation that the song will be heard. By exposing the
Court's presumption in favor of preemption, this Article applauds the increase in
clarity of congressional intent that may be obtained. That clarity will be
forthcoming only if Congress is really disposed against preemption. It may not be.
If not, so be it. But it is at least possible that the increasing number of persons who
are affected by the federal preemption of state common law damages actions might
be motivated to act on their federal legislators to defeat the presumption of
preemption that the Supreme Court has created. In our federalist system, the
Supreme Court should not be permitted to continue to affect the traditional
operation of state law in the stealth manner that it has by hiding behind behind a
presumption that does not exist. This Article seeks to unmask the presumption in
favor of preemption that, indeed, operates.
It is important to define legal doctrines as accurately as possible so that they
can be understood and relied upon predictably. In the area of federal preemption of
common law actions, particularly product liability actions, doctrinal clarity will be
promoted, and thus predictability furthered, only if the presumption that operates
in preemption analysis is unmasked for what it is-a presumption in favor of, not
against, preemption.

II. THE SUPREME COURT AND PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Preemption doctrine has a long history 6 and is based in a variety of
constitutional sources.' 7 By far the bulk of preemption analysis has taken place,
14. E.g., Nelson, supra note 3, at 302 ("If members of Congress are unaware of a bill's
preemptive effects when they vote for it, the political safeguards of federalism are unlikely to check
those effects.... Whatever competing interests Congress is trying to balance, the lawmaking process
does not function in an ideal way when members of Congress vote for bills without fully
understanding what they mean.").
15. Grey, supra note 3, at 613-18; Raeker-Jordan, supranote 2, at 1381, 1428-45.
16. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 211 (1824) (stating that preemption occurs
when state laws "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the

constitution").
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (listing prohibited state governmental actions such as treaty activity,
coining of money, or granting of nobility); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (dormant Commerce Clause
limitation on state regulation that places an undue burden on interstate commerce); U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. I (privileges and immunities clause); U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
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however, under the Supremacy Clause which states that federal law "shall be the
supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.""i
Most of the Court's very early cases involved the tension between the newly formed
federal government's powers and those of the states and, thus, necessarily required
an evaluation of the relationship of the power of those governments. Cases such as
McCulloch v. Maryland,'9 and its discussion of the exclusivity of the federal
government's taxingpower, and Gibbons v. Ogden,2 on the supremacy of a federal
licensing statute regarding the use of the nation's waterways, provide powerful
examples of how the early Republic had many conflicts to resolve as the federal
government and the states challenged each other on how the shared governmental
authority would be wielded.2 ' The Framers very likely had no reason to expect the
broad power that would be placed in Congress under the Commerce Clause and,
thus, likely would not have contemplated the nature of the federal/state conflicts
that have resulted from it.'
True preemption doctrine, then, was in its infancy until the unprecedented
legislative activity of the post-Depression era. Until that time, the Court was faced
with little truly comprehensive legislation of the kind that the 1930s and 1940s

18. U. S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For an alternative view of the source of the preemptive power of
congressional legislation, see Gardbaum, supranote 3, at 781-83 (placing preemption authority in the
Necessary and Proper Clause), but see Nelson, supra note 3, at 234 & n.32 (refuting Gardbaum's
thesis).
Recent scholars have given content to the history of preemption under the Supremacy Clause.
See Nelson, supra note 3, at 235-60. Professor Nelson describes the meaning of the Clause's
concluding non obstanteclause and has persuasively argued that much of preemption doctrine under
the Supremacy Clause is misguided as a result of a failure to understand that clause from the
perspective of legislative drafting techniques used at the time. Id. at 237-44. Professor Nelson argues
for an analytical framework for preemption cases that would rely on a "logical contradiction" test,
based on his historical analysis of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 260-64.
Professor Wolfson argues that the Supremacy Clause was adopted by the Framers in lieu of a
proposed congressional veto of state law power that was rejected by the Constitutional Convention
as a way of compromising on that thorny issue, and, therefore, also ensuring that state judges
respected and enforced federal law. Wolfson, supra note 3, at 88-91.
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
20. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) I (1824).
21. For a discussion of the early Supreme Court cases and their relation to preemption doctrine,
see Nelson, supra note 3, at 265-76; see also Gardbaum, supra note 3, at 785-95 ("For most of the
nineteenth century, the Court typically decided cases involving the relationship between state and
federal power not on preemption grounds, but on grounds of exclusivity or supremacy alone.").
22. In arguing that Congress exercises a power that the Framers probably intended to deny it,
Wolfson states:
There is considerable support for the view that the expansion of Congress'[s]
commerce power was essential to enable some part ofthe government to address
commercial problems that are national in scope, and thus beyond the power of
the states to regulate effectively, and yet not so national in nature as to demand
regulation by Congress alone.
Wolfson, supra note 3, at 91 (footnotes omitted).
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produced.' It may seem unusual, then, that the Court would analyze the more
limited congressional legislation enacted during the early twentieth century by
finding that, simply by virtue of that legislation, the states were entirely precluded
from exercising their concurrent power within it. That is, however, in fact exactly
how the Court's preemption analysis at that time can be described.
A. PreemptionDoctrine in the Early Twentieth Century
In the early part of the twentieth century, the Court's preemption cases can
usefully be classified as involving the concept of latent exclusivity. 2A At that time,
the Court's preemption analysis involved a very broad reading of congressional
purposes and, thus, federal legislation was often found to "occupy the field," to the
exclusion of state regulation. This very broad reading of many federal regulations,
with virtually no support for congressional intent to so operate, resulted in almost
automatic preemption of concurrent state regulation.25
That regulation of railroads in interstate commerce might be one such area is
not surprising,26 though the limited nature of the early federal legislation in the area
does not compel that conclusion. 27 Nonetheless, the notion that federal legislation
in an area "occupied" that field began to take form in the early twentieth century

23. See Gardbaum, supranote 3, at 783 (stating that "recognition ofpreemption was an intrinsic
part of the expansion of federal power that has taken place over the course of this century").
24. This phrase is borrowed from Professor Stephen Gardbaum. Id. at 801. Professor Gardbaum
explores the pre-twentieth century cases and describes them as reflecting "confusion and
ambivalence." Id. at 795-800. He further states:
The period from 1912-1920 marked the end of the prevailing confusion,
with the Court issuing for the first time consistently clear and explicit statements
of genuine preemption principles. It is not merely conflicting state laws that are
overridden by federal law on the same subject, but any state laws-even those
that are consistent with and supplement federal law. The effect of congressional
action is to end the concurrent power of the states and thereby to create
exclusive power at the federal level from that time on.
Id. at 801.
25. See id. at 786 (discussing early preemption cases having this effect).
26. Those who have only passing familiarity with tort law know the power that the railroads
had on the formation of tort law in this country, as well as on our economic and social structure. See,
e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 468 (2d ed. 1985) ("The modem law
of torts must be laid at the door of the industrial revolution, whose machines had a marvelous capacity
for smashing the human body."); EDWARD G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECrUAL
HIsTORY 16, 22 (1980).
Equally as influential on this subject is the work of Professor Gary T. Schwartz, whom this

Symposium honors. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America: A Reinterpretation,90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1739-48 (1981); Gary T. Schwartz, The Character
of EarlyAmerican Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REv. 641, 651-60 (1989).
On this topic generally, see MARTINI. HOROwITZ, THE TRANSFORMATIONOF AMERICANLAW, 17801860 (1977); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rnv. 359

(1951).
27. Gardbaum, supra note 3, at 801 (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the

GuildedAge: Federalismand the RailroadProblem, 97 YALE L. J. 1017 (1988)).
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with cases involving railroad regulations.28 In Southern Railway Co. v. Reid,29 the
Court described in some detail the doctrine which would come to be known as
"occupation of the field" implied preemption. Reid involved railroad freight
regulations under the Interstate Commerce Act,3 ° but no federal regulations had
been issued dealing with the plaintiffs particular transportation needs.3 The Court
concluded that even though there was no particular federal regulation governing the
plaintiffs claim, the broad federal regulatory authority under the Interstate
Commerce Act was action enough to indicate the Congress had taken possession
of the field.32 This was so even though the state regulation the plaintiff relied upon
complemented the federal scheme. The Court declared that the absence of federal

regulation did not leave room for the states to regulate, and that the railroad must
be left to follow the dictates of the federal scheme. 3 In a subsequent railroad
regulation matter, the Court stated, "When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law
is not to be34 declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen
fit to go.
InNew York CentralRailroadCo. v. Winfeld,35 the Court concluded similarly
that the Employers' Liability Act, 36 which defined the negligence liability of
railroads to employees, prevented the states from providing either a supplemental
common law or workers' compensation coverage for such injured workers, even
where the state coverage was intended to complement the Act's provisions.37

28. Gardbaum, supra note 3, at 801 ("This double shift in the direction of enhanced federal
power, which was in stark contrast to the Court's practice of almost always upholding state laws
during the previous century, was undoubtedly driven by a perception that uniform regulation,
especially (but not only) of the railroads, had become a national necessity.").
29. 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
30. Id. at435.
31. Mrs. Reid tendered household and other goods to the railroad to be transported across state
lines. Id. at 432-33. The railroad refused to accept the goods until it could determine the rate, which
had not yet been established for that particular route. Id. at 433. It took the railroad six days to do so,
and the delay cost Mrs. Reid $25.00. Id. at 432-34. Mrs. Reid sued under a North Carolina statute
which required carriers to accept freight tendered for shipment or pay a fine and damages, and she
won. Id. at 431-34. The railroad challenged the North Carolina law as a violation of the interstate
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 434.
32. Id. at 437-38.
33. Id. at 442. Indeed, in future cases the Court would declare that:
[Tihe power of the State over the subject-matter [of railroad regulation] ceased
to exist from the moment that Congress exerted its paramount and all embracing
authority over the subject. We say this because the elementary and long settled
doctrine is that there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce and
that the regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426,435 (1913).
34. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915)
(citations omitted) (holding that federal law preempted a South Carolina statute that imposed a
penalty for failure to settle claims within forty days, even though plaintiff claimed the state statute
complemented Congress's scheme to govern railroad conduct).
35. 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
36. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994) (originally enacted Apr. 22, 1908, amended 1939).
37. Winfield, 244 U.S. at 148-54.
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Plaintiff was injured during his employment with the railroad, though not through
its negligence, and received workers' compensation coverage from his state. 38 The
Court found that the Act was exclusive, though it did not so provide, 9 and that state
law was entirely preempted.' The Court relied almost singularly on the desire for
uniformity stated in the legislative history.4' The Court's analysis is conclusory:
"[I]f Congress have a constitutional power to regulate a particular
subject, and they do actually regulate it in a given manner, and in
a certain form, it cannot be that the state legislatures have a right
to interfere .... In such a case, the legislation of Congress, in
what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that it does not intend
that there shall be any farther legislation to act upon the
subject-matter. Its silence as to what it does not do, is as
expressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions made by
it." Thus, the act is as comprehensive of injuries occurring without
negligence, as to which class it impliedly excludes liability, as it
is of those as to which it imposes liability. In other words, it is a
regulation of the carriers' duty or obligation as to both.42
In dissent, Justice Brandeis defined as clearly as had theretofore been
attempted, the circumstances in which congressional action would be found to
impliedly preempt state regulation in the field, and particularly in an area of the
state's "police powers."'4 Modem "obstacle" implied preemption, as identified
above where the Court evaluates whether state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of federal purposes to determine the preemptive effect of federal
legislation, can be traced to Justice Brandeis' description of the bases of
preemption. He states that if Congress's legislative purpose cannot be
accomplished, or "its operation frustrated" by state law, then state law must yield
but only ifCongress's intent to supercede is supported by actual conflict with the
state law; limited federal legislation in the field is insufficient to infer total

38. Id. at 148.

39. 45 U.S.C. § 51 states:
Every common carrier by railroad... shall be liable ...to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier ...for such injury or death resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence ....
40. Winfield, 244 U.S. at 149-53.
41. Id. at 149-150. The Court never even quoted the language of the statute.
42. Id. at 153 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 155 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The first rule is that Congress's commerce power was
not intended to deprive the states from legislating on subjects "relating to the health, life, and safety
of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country." Id.
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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preemption." He concluded that the legislation in issue was not comprehensive but,
rather, that it was narrowly written, and clearly so, to deal only with negligence
actions and to permit injured employees to get out from under the long-subsisting
common law defenses that continued to hamperrecovery." Congress, therefore, did

not mean to prevent the States from providing more in the way of compensation for
injured railroad workers.
The difference between the analysis in the majority opinion in Winfield, very
thin and conclusory, and the thorough study of the legislation in Justice Brandeis'
opinion reflects a difference in approach to preemption that continues to exist today.
The majority would broadly find preemption based on perceived rather than
factually supported congressional intent, to accomplish a broad Court-derived
legislative purpose; the dissent would narrowly analyze the federal legislation in
respect for the reserved police powers of the states. This difference in Winfield
might reflect, more than anything, the Court's willingness to find expansive federal
preemption at a time when the federal government was beginning, in a meaningful
way, to flex its legislative muscle.' Nonetheless, the result was an expansive
implied preemption doctrine which supported preemptive scope on little to no
evidence of congressional intent-a presumption in favor of preemption.

B. PreemptionDoctrineandPost-DepressionFederalRegulation:The 1940s
and 1950s
Congress continued to flex its legislative muscle in the 1930s and 1940s with
New Deal legislation, and the Court permitted the significant expansion of

44. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912)). In addition, "a
statute enacted in execution of a reserved power ofthe state is not to be regarded as inconsistent with
an act of Congress .. . unless the repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts
cannot be reconciled." Savage, 225 U.S. at 535. Savage, on which Justice Brandeis relied, involved
the Food and Drug Act of 1906 and its regulations regarding misbranding. Id. at 509. The State of
Indiana had certain food misbranding regulations dealing with animal feed which were challenged
as contrary to the federal requirements and, thus, preempted. Id. at 503-09. There was no express
preemption provision directed at the issue. Id. at 532. Seeking evidence of congressional intent to
preempt, the Court stated:
But the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as
to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the
mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy
a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of
Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.
Id. at 533.
45. Winfield, 244 U.S. at 164 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The facts showing the origin and scope of the act ... indicate also its
purpose. It was to end the denial of the right to damages for injuries due to the
railroads' negligence-a right denied under judicial decisions through the
interposition of the defenses of fellow-servant, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence.
Id.
46. See Gardbaum, supra note 3, at 805-806 (referring to the Progressive social and political
movement of the 1920s as influencing the Court's preemption decisions).
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Congress's power under the Commerce Clause at this time. 47 If the "presumption
in favor of preemption" described above were to continue, vast areas of traditional
state authority would be subsumed under congressional legislation with very little
showing in the way of congressional intent to so legislate. The Court found itself
in the unenviable position, then, of defining Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause expansively, and through its preemption doctrine implicitly expanding that
power even further.
The Court, perhaps in partial recognition of this dilemma, began in earnest in
the 1940s to refocus preemption analysis on the discernment of congressional
intent. The Court began to apply circumspectly the "occupation of the field"
implied preemption doctrine derived from the railroad cases. In 1941, the Court
decided Hines v. Davidowitz, 48 in which it elaborated upon "occupation ofthe field"
preemption. Hines involved the Alien Registration Act of 1940 in which Congress
enacted an all-embracing system of alien registration.49 One year before Hines,
Pennsylvania had enacted a statute dealing with the same general topic through
slightly different means.5"
The Court began by emphasizing the flexibility of preemption analysis,
abjuring "any rigid formula,"51 when seeking Congress's intent absent its
expression. The Court focused on the uniquely national nature of the foreign affairs
field such that any concurrent state power must be "restricted to its narrowest
limits.""2 The Court found that the federal legislation was intended to be "allembracing" and "plainly manifested" an intention to regulate through one uniform
national system, relying throughout on the national importance of unitary treatment
of the issue.53
While trying to restrict the scope of "occupation of the field" implied
preemption, the Court was also becoming more solicitous of the preserved state
police powers and, indeed, began to require clearer evidence of congressional intent

47. Id. at 806 ("The greatly enlarged power granted to Congress by the new interpretation of
the Commerce Clause took from the states theirpreviously sacrosanct exclusive power over intrastate
commerce.").
48. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

60-61.
59-61. Several other states had similar legislation at that time as well. Id. at 61 n.8.
67.
68. The Court was also sensitive to the impact that either federal or state regulations

in the area would have on the individual rights and liberties of the persons affected. The Court studied

the history of treatment of aliens in this country as well as the history of the particular legislation at
issue. Id. at 70-71.
53. Id. at 72-74. In dissent, Justice Stone reminds the reader of the continuing tension in our
federal system of government over how to strike the balance between state and federal control:
At a time when the exercise of the federal power is being rapidly expended

through Congressional action, it is difficult to overstate the importance of
safeguarding against such diminution of state power by vague inferences as to
what Congress might have intended if it had considered the matter or by
reference to our own conceptions of a policy which Congress has not expressed
and which is not plainly to be inferred from the legislation which it has enacted.
Id. at 75 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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to preempt in other circumstances.5 4 In Rice v. Santa FeElevatorCorp., s the Court

defined the importance of discerning congressional intent to preempt. Rice
continues to be considered the classic explanation of implied preemption doctrine
which focuses on the discernment of congressional intent, and the Court continues
to cite it for its general explanation of implied preemption doctrine.
Rice involved the Federal Warehouse Act, 56which as originally enacted in 1916
specifically gave state regulation in the area priority over federal regulation. 7 The
statute was amended in 1931 to provide authority to the Secretary ofAgriculture to
license warehouses and gave the Secretary "exclusive" authority over those federal
licensees. 8 The plaintiff in Rice challenged a variety of Illinois warehousing
regulations, most of which did not directly conflict with federal regulations but,
rather, were more comprehensive than the federal counterpart.59 The federal act
gave exclusive authority to the Secretary regarding federal licensees only and did
not speak to many of the issues governed by the state regulation."
The Court applied implied preemption doctrine and began the ongoing debate
over how to define congressional intent. The Court defined in Rice the widely
quoted presumption against preemption: "Congress legislated here in a field which
the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. ' 61 Congress's purpose,
according to the Court, can be evidenced in several ways: (1) the federal scheme
is pervasive, leaving no room for the States to supplement it;6" (2) the federal
legislation involves a field dominated by the federal interest precluding state
enforcement of laws on the same subject;63 or (3) state policy produces a result
inconsistent with the federal objective.' Finding no dominant federal interest or

54. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740,
748-49 (1942) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act did not impliedly preempt local
regulations against mass picketing, threatening employees desiring to work with physical injury or
property damage, obstructing entrance to and egress from the company's factory, obstructing the
streets and public roads surrounding the factory, and picketing the homes of employees; "an 'intention
of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested."')
(citations omitted); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933) (holding that an intention to
impliedly preempt state regulation to prevent infectious cattle diseases must have a definite and
clearly expressed "purpose to supersede or exclude ...state action is not to be lightly inferred" by
Congress's Cattle Contagious Diseases Acts).
55. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
56. 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-256 (1994).
57. Rice, 331 U.S. at 222.
58. Id. at223-24.
59. Id. at 224-29 (including such matters as rates, discrimination, mixing grain, and
maintenance of elevators).
60. Id. at229.
61. Id. at 230 (citing Napier v. At. Coast Line R.R., Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1917)).
62. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566
(1919)).
63. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) and N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield,
244 U.S. 147 (1917)).
64. Id. (citing Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)).
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pervasive federal scheme of regulation, the Court applied the third method of
discerning congressional intent: that state policy is inconsistent with the federal
objective.65
After review of the statute's terms, and, most importantly, its "special and
peculiar history,"66 the Court found that the reference to "exclusive" authority in the
Secretary of Agriculture coupled with the policy reflected in the legislative history
to create independent regulation "without regard to State acts" evidenced
Congress's intent to displace state regulation entirely in the field, in spite of the
numerous areas left unregulated by the federal legislation. 7 The Court was sensitive
to the argument that a more narrow interpretation of congressional intent was
plausible,68 but concluded that "[t]he test, therefore, is whether the matter on which
the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act. If it is,
the federal scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive regulatory
plan than that of the State. ' 69 This statement suggests a simple test of preemption
reminiscent of the latent exclusivity cases of earlier years, yet one much broader in
application because it is not based on federal occupation of the field, but rather on
a more general assessment of federal objectives and state interaction with those
objectives.7"
Rice describes a test of clear and manifest congressional intent to preempt and
relies on statutory interpretation, statutory scope, and legislative history to discern
that intent. Rice applies an implied preemption analysis that seeks to determine
whether "state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the
federal statute" in the case of very specific economic regulation. Cases dealing with
conflicting direct state regulation would seem to admit a straightforward application
of an intent-based test-did Congress intend to permit the states authority to
regulate directly in the same area or not? To date, the Court's cases tell us little
about the Court's view of preemption of indirect state "regulation" based on private
litigation applying traditional state tort doctrine. The Court very broadly preempted
state tort law, as well as workers' compensation statutes, inWinfield under the
Federal Employers' Liability Acts because of the uniformity in railroad regulation
it perceived as central to the federal legislative scheme. Will an implied preemption
analysis seeking the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt result

65. Id. at 236.
66. Id. at 232.
67. Id. at 234-236.
68. Rice, 331 U.S. at 232.
69. Id. at 236.
70. For a recognition of the breadth of the Court's analysis, see Rice, 331 U.S. at 241
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter applied a more narrowly tailored test, very similar to
that articulated by Justice Brandeis'dissent in Winfield decades earlier:
[D]ue regard for our federalism, in its practical operation, favors survival ofthe
reserved authority of a State over matters that are the intimate concern of the
State unless Congress has clearly swept the boards of all State authority, or the
State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has ordered.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 155 (1917)
(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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differently in such cases?
In San Diego Building Trades Councilv. Garmon,71 the Court was faced with

an application of modem implied preemption doctrine as it applied to state
common law damages actions and their effect on a federal regulatory scheme.72
Garmon involved whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended

by the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947 (LMRA), preempted state tort
law-based actions for damages by employers injured in the course of peaceful
picketing by labor activists. 73 The NLRA did not occupy the field of labor and
industrial relations and clearly left room for the states to regulate those matters not

governed by the federal scheme.74 The Court, therefore, had to determine the extent
of authority left to the states in labor relations after the NLRA, particularly as
it
75
related to the permissibility of state tort actions based protected labor activity.

The Court honestly spoke of the difficulty of ascertaining congressional intent,
particularly when the enacting Congress, writing twenty-five years earlier, likely
did not foresee, nor could have foreseen, the problems the Court would be required
to address.

6

The Court was sensitive to the nature of the regulatory scheme in

place---"new and complicated" and"drawn withbroad strokes"----that required the
Court to carry out Congress's purposes "by giving application to congressional

incompletion."78
The Court focused on the nature of the regulatory scheme Congress created and
the potential conflicts that were posed to that scheme by "inconsistent standards of

71. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
72. Id. at 237-39.
73. Id. at 241-46 (analyzing National Labor Relations and Labor Management Relations Acts,
29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1994)).
74. Id. at 240. In determining that the NLRA did not occupy the field, Justice Frankfurter
quoted an earlier Court decision dealing with this issue:
"Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over industrial
relations given by the Commerce Clause. Congress formulated a code whereby
it outlawed some aspects of labor activities and left others free for the operation
of economic forces. As to both categories, the areas that have been pre-empted
by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible
of delimitation by fixed metes and bounds.... [T]he [LMRA] 'leaves much to
the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.' This
penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the course of
litigation."
Id. (quoting Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955) (citations omitted)).
75. The Court in Garmon had earlier decided that the NLRA did preempt a state court
injunction prohibiting the picketing, which was governed by the NLRA even though the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had declined jurisdiction over the representation proceeding in the
case because it did not satisfy the Board's monetary standards in taking jurisdiction. Id. at 237-39.
76. Id. at 240 ("This Court was called upon to apply a new and complicated legislative scheme,
the aims and social policy of which were drawn with broad strokes while the details had to be filled
in, to no small extent, by the judicial process.").
77. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240.
78. Id. ("IlThe areas that have been pre-empted by federal authority and thereby withdrawn
from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and bounds.") (citing Weber, 348
U.S. at 488).
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substantive law and differing rethedial schemes. '79 The Court was governed by the
"unifying consideration"of its prior decisions under the NLRA that Congress
entrusted national labor policy to the NLRB, and, thus, "judicial concern has
necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which the States have sought to
regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted."80 The Court focused on
the nature of the activities regulated and not on the method, contrary to its analysis
in both Rice and Hines, and concluded that state tort law damages were preempted
because "to allow the States to control conduct which is the subject of national
regulation would create potentialfrustration of nationalpurposes."'" The only
reference to anything akin to a presumption against preemption in areas ofhistorical
state concern came with the Court's acknowledgment that in areas of "interests so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" Congress's "compelling
congressional direction" was required before depriving the States of the power to
act.8" The "compelling direction" to preempt was found, however, by reference
merely to the "central aim of federal regulation."83
The state regulation in Garmon, it must be remembered, was through laws of
"broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the
govemance of industrial relations."84 The NLRB had specifically declined
jurisdiction in the case,8" arguably leaving room for the State to act to fill the void.
The Court was unpersuaded that this void made any difference. Indeed, the Court
found that a failure of the Board to act did not give the States any greater authority:
"The governing consideration is that to allow the States to control activities that are
potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with
national labor policy."86
The Court's attitude toward the regulatory nature of common law damages
actions is articulated in Garmon: "Such regulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method
of governing conduct and controlling policy. 8 7 The Court's attitude toward the

79. Id. at 242.

80. Id. at 242-43.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
Id.
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
Id. (footnote omitted).

85. Id. at 238.
86. Id. at 246 (emphasis added). The Court cites for this proposition one of its early railroad

cases finding preemption of state authority in that field, Charleston & W. Carolina R.R. Co. v.
Varnville FurnitureCo., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915), where the Court said, "When Congress has taken
the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition."
87. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246-47. The Court sought to distinguish those cases which had been

permitted to proceed under state law involving violent conduct which threatened the public order. Id.
at 247. The Court stated that these cases were permitted to proceed because "the compelling state
interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in
the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction." Id. The present case, according to the
Court, presented "no such compelling state interest." Id. at 248.
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permissibility of common law damages actions in the face of federal regulation of
conduct which forms the basis for such actions continues to be central to
preemption analysis. The Court will rely on Garmon for this proposition in future
preemption cases. Of additional importance to the Court in Garmon,however, was
the comprehensiveness of the NLRA and the powerful purpose which it served-to
protect workers and recognize their collective efforts, not to inhibit them. In
Garmon, the employer sought tort law damages against the putative union in a way
that may have decreased the protection afforded to just those workers the NLRA
sought to protect.
The Court in Garmon wrote with a very broad brush about the preemptive
effect ofa statute which it recognized left significant room for the states to regulate.
As the 1950s drew to a close, the Court appeared to move back to its doctrine of
latent exclusivity even though it paid some attention to the requirement of clear
evidence of congressional intent to preempt. The concern for protecting state
authority in areas of traditional local control which motivated cases early in this
period turned out to be an insignificant one as the Court found intent to preempt in
such a wide variety of circumstances. When the traditional state authority being
considered was the private common law action for redress of grievances, the Court
reverted to its earlier doctrine of exclusive federal authority. In the two areas seen
thus far where the Court preempted common law damages actions, under the FELA
and the NLRA, the Court was influenced more by the perceived national
importance of the subject matter than by evidenced congressional intent to preempt
or the concern for traditional state authority.
C. PreemptionDoctrineandIndividualRights/ConsumerProtectionism:The
1960s and 1970s
Preemption doctrine at the end ofthe 1950s can be described as building on the
foundation of congressional intent but finding that foundation very unstable. Such
intent had been found when the area regulated was one of peculiarly national
concern as in Hines. When the area was not one requiring uniformity because of its
national importance, but rather was one of traditional state regulation, congressional
purpose to preempt was to be clearly found. Such purpose was typically found
easily, as in Rice even though the federal statute was not comprehensive and the
state regulations in issue were complementary and not in conflict. Finally, the
legislative scheme in Gannon, which suggested a broad role for state law,
supported a finding of intent to preempt to protect conduct "plainly within the
central aim of federal regulation" and to prevent "frustration of national
purposes."" The Court's implied preemption doctrine, then, continued its quest to
discern congressional intent, and always seemed to find it.
In the early 1960s, however, the Court began in earnest to limit the breadth of
its implied obstacle preemption analysis. InFloridaLime & Avocado Growers,Inc.

88. Id. at 244.
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v. Paul,89 the Court was asked to determine whether a California statute dealing
with maturity standards for avocados could apply in the face of a seemingly
contrary federal standard on the same issue.9" Both the California and the federal
regulation had as their purpose the protection of consumers from immature
avocados. 9' Some portion of Florida avocados could not meet the California
maturity standards, and the plaintiff sought a determination that the California
standards were preempted by the federal regulations. 92 At first blush, it would seem
that after Hines, Rice, and Garmon, each of which found implied preemption with
much less in conflict than FloridaLime & Avocado Growers,the Court would have
no difficulty with the avocado regulations. But that was not to be.
The Court reiterated that the implied preemption inquiry is whether there is
clear congressional intent to preempt,93 and such intent is discovered by reference
to two questions: "Does either the nature of the subject matter, namely the maturity
of avocados, or any explicit declaration of congressional design to displace state
regulation, require [state regulation] to yield to the federal [regulation]?"94 The

Court could have, but did not, define the subject matter broadly as agricultural
regulation to insure standards of quality and free competition.95 The Court found
that it was not physically impossible to comply with both regulations,96 and
observed that regulation of food quality was a traditional area of state concern such
that "the States have always possessed a legitimate interest in 'the protection of
... [their] people against fraud and deception in the sale of food products' at retail

89. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).

90. Id. at 134. The importance of the issue to the Florida and California avocado growers, and
the nature of avocados, is fully explored by the Court. Id. at 138-141.

91. Id. at 137-38. The California regulation was enacted in 1925. Id. at 137. The federal
marketing regulations were adopted in 1954 pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 601-627. Id. at 138. The declared purposes of the Act "are to restore and maintain parity prices

for the benefit of producers of agricultural commodities, to ensure the stable and steady flow of
commodities to consumers, and 'to establish and maintain such minimum standards of quality and
maturity"' in the public interest. Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 602(3)).
92. Id. at 141.
93. Id. at 142. The Court stated:
The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of
a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power
in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated

subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 143.
95. Indeed, the dissent makes just this point when applying the implied preemption doctrine
from Rice and Hines to the case: "The Secretary has promulgated a comprehensive and pervasive

regulatory scheme for determining the quality and maturity of Florida avocados, pursuant to the
statutory mandate to 'effectuate such orderly marketing ofsuch agricultural commodities."' Id. at 16667 (White, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 142-43. The impossibility standard of implied preemption is often mentioned but
rarely applied. Id.
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markets within their borders."' The Court sought unambiguouscongressional intent
to oust traditional state authority in this field of consumer protection." The Court
found no desire by Congress for uniformity of regulation nor an intent to regulate
in any comprehensive way.99
A few months later, the Court relied on FloridaLime & Avocado Growers and
concluded that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 did not preempt price
advertising regulations in that field of comprehensive federal legislation.' It
emphasized the validity of state statutes "unless there is found 'such actual conflict
between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, [or]
evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field.""0..1 The Court at this time
seems to have a renewed interest in protecting state authority, at least in the area of
consumer protection. 0 2
Consistent with an increased respect for traditional state roles, the Court, in
Retail Clerks International-Ass'nv. Schermerhorn, °3 the Court concluded that in
the area of right-to-work laws, Congress chose to abandon any search for
uniformity and left the area to the states.!" This result seems at odds with Garmon
decided just a few years earlier. The Court in Retail Clerks stated that "[t]he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in preemption analysis." 5 The
NLRA had expressly reserved a state's power to permit right-to-work laws,
however inconsistent with the general purpose of the labor laws to support
collective bargaining.0 ' Retail Clerks, then, suggests that the Court was serious

97. Id. at 144 (citing, interalia, Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (alteration in original).
The Court stated that minimum federal regulations in one aspect of a regulated field should not be
taken to imply preemption over other aspects, particularly in an area of traditional state interest:
Federal regulation by means of minimum standards of the picking, processing,
and transportation of agricultural commodities, however comprehensive for
those purposes that regulation may be, does not of itself import displacement of
state control over the distribution and retail sale of those commodities in the
interests of the consumers of the commodities within the State ...
Congressional regulation of one end of the stream of commerce does not, ipso
facto, oust all state regulation at the other end.
Id. at 145 (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 146-47 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
99. Id. at 147. The Court canvassed the legislative scheme, its history, the limited administrative
authority established, and the enactment of other legislation at the same.time that did reflect a desire
for uniformity. Id. at 148-150.
100. Head v. New Mexico Bd.of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424,431 (1963).
101. Id. at 430 (quoting FloridaLime &Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141)) (alteration in
original).
102. In the area of labor and industrial relations, the Court continued to find preemption
according to Garmon, but its dedication to a broad implied preemptive scope seemed to lessen. In
several cases the Court found preemption of state labor regulations. E.g., Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S.
301, 310 (1964); Local No. 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 708 (1963).
103. 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
104. Id. at 98.
105. Id. at 103.
106. Id. at 99.
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about the centrality of congressional intent in preemption analysis. 0 7 The Court
acknowledged the potential conflict with Garmon but emphasized that where
Congress's intent is clear,"'8 the implied preemption doctrine of Garmon does not
control."0 9
The Court continued to recognize during this time, however, that some
legislative schemes are all-encompassing based on the history which informs
them,"'0 or their peculiarly national focus."1 ' A legislative enactmentthatpreempted
conflicting state law because of its uniquely national nature was the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972.112 The Court
found in City ofBurbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc."3 that local ordinances
prohibiting air traffic at certain times of day were preempted by federal
regulations." 4 The Court recognized the peculiarly local nature of noise control," 5
but also recognized that Congress had created "a delicate balance between safety
and efficiency, and the protection of persons on the ground" whose
"interdependence . . .require[d] a uniform and exclusive system of federal

regulation if the congressional objectives" of the Act were to be fulfilled. 6
The Court explored the legislative history closely, finding equivocation
regarding the intent to preempt, and ultimately focused on the nature of the problem
that Congress sought to address, one it considered to require the uniformity of

unimpeded national regulation." 7 In dissent, now-Chief Justice Rehnquist
strenuously advocated in favor of the presumption against preemption of state

107. Id. at 100-01. The Court relies on the legislative history for the "clear and unambiguous
...
purpose of Congress not to preempt the field," including not affecting state court power to enforce
laws. Id. at 101.
108. Id. at 103 ("Where Congress gives state policy that degree of overriding authority, we are
reluctant to conclude that it is nonetheless enforceable by the federal agency in Washington.").
109. Retail Clerks, 375 U.S. at 103. The Court describes Garmon as not providing a
"constitutional principle," but, rather, it "merely rationalizes the problems of coexistence between
federal and state regulatory schemes in the field of labor relations ....Id.
110. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 308, 310-12 (1964) (holding that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 required reversal of state trespass convictions even though convictions predated
passage of the Act; regardless of congressional intent to reach pending state prosecutions, the Civil
Rights Act forbad the state laws from operating); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970)
(holding that the Voting Rights Act broadly preempts conflicting state laws except those regarding
purely state elections).
111. Matters involving foreign affairs continue to be treated in this way. See Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (holding foreign affairs power supreme; state property disposition
laws preempted where in conflict with foreign affairs matters). Similarly, immigration and nationality
matters are treated this way. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 380 (1971) (finding
immigration policy supreme over inconsistent state residency requirements).
112. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-60503 (1994) (section number revised in 1994).
113. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
114. Id. at640.
115. Id. at 638.
116. Id. at 638-639 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 634-38. There was no express preemption provision and the Court acknowledged
that the pervasive nature of the federal regulatory scheme supported its conclusion ofpreemption most
of all.
Id.
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police powers and quoted from Garmon: "This assumption derives from our basic
constitutional division of legislative competence between the States and Congress;
from 'due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including
the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a
promoter of democracy."' 118 Justice Rehnquist has since joined those on the Court
who disagree with the presumption which suggests the tenuous hold it has had in
preemption doctrine, as well as the Court's internal struggles with the doctrine
generally.
In Perez v. Campbell,"9 the Court addressed the question of implied
preemption by one federal statutory scheme, bankruptcy legislation, of an entirely
different state regulatory scheme, motor vehicle safety and responsibility laws. 2
In Perez,the Court overruled twvo prior cases in which the Court had concluded that
the federal bankruptcy laws did not preempt state motor vehicle public
responsibility legislation.'2 ' The federal bankruptcy code, intending to provide a
clean slate for debtors," preempted the state motor vehicle responsibility
legislation which would suspend the drivers' license of a judgment debtor even
though the bankruptcy code provided relief from the debt."
The Court in Perez applied implied obstacle preemption doctrine.124 The Court
noted that it was not important that the state regulation was enacted for a different
purpose than the federal legislation, but the controlling principle was whether the
state law, whateverits purpose, frustrated the full effectiveness of the federal law."2
Of course, all the cases relied on by the Court did, in fact, deal with federal and
state legislation directed at the same purpose, and also involved regulatory schemes
that called for national uniformity such as immigration 126 and labor laws. 27 The
Court did not refer to any provision of the federal bankruptcy legislation, nor any
legislative history, nor any other evidence of congressional intent to support its
conclusion. With very little analysis, the Court rejected the state motor vehicle
safety and responsibility laws, with nary a word of the presumption against
preemption in areas involving public health and safety, traditional areas of state

118. City ofBurbank,411 U.S. at 643 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted).
119. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
120. Id. at 638.
121. Id. at 650-52 (overruling Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) and Reitz
v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941)).
122. Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 641-42.
124. Id. at 649.
125. Id. at 651-52.
126. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 53 (1941).
127. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 235-36 (1967); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S.
538, 539 (1945). The Court also refers to FloridaLime & Avocado Growers for the frustration of
purposes implied preemption doctrine, Perez,402 U.S. at 650, and, of course, it found no preemption
in that case even though the state regulation directly related to the subject matter of the congressional
legislation. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-47 (1963).
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domain. 12 The Court did not appear concerned with discerning congressional
129
intent nor with protecting the state's traditional authority in the area.
The use of obstacle/frustration of purposes implied preemption in Perez is
important for a variety of reasons. The Court overruled two prior cases directly
finding no Supremacy Clause violation in the same type of case. The Court relied
on cases which involved a need for national uniformity in the field in question;
Perez certainly did not. The Court spoke not once of a presumption against
preemption, even though the subject matter of state regulation was so clearly
directed at local public safety issues. The Court did not consider the provisions of
the federal bankruptcy code, enacted in the 1920s and 1930s, in any detail to
discern congressional intent to preempt.
Implied preemption cases during this time seem to be coalescing into what have
become the standard implied preemption categories. The Court applied federal
"occupation" of a field implied preemption more narrowly to cases where Congress
had regulated not only comprehensively, but in an area deserving of nationally
uniform treatment, thereby displaying an intent to leave the states no regulatory
room to act. 130 Congressional intent to preempt areas of traditional state authority
13
was, the Court said, to be demonstrated as the "clear and manifest purpose,"'
particularly where state and federal legislation did not directly conflict.'32

128. Perez, 402 U.S. at 652. Expressing skepticism of state legislative purposes, the Court
opined: "[S]uch a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal
legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state interest or
policy." Id.
129. See id. at 657 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated:
The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all
our wars....
This being so, it is a matter of deep concern to me that today the Court
lightly brushes aside and overrules two cases where it had upheld a
representative attempt by the States to regulate traffic and where the Court had
considered and rejected the very Supremacy Clause argument that it now
discovers to be so persuasive.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a strenuous criticism of obstacle implied preemption, and Perez,
in particular, see Nelson, supranote 3 at, 265-268.
130. See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text. Compare DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351 (1976) (holding California Labor Code regulating employment of illegal aliens not preempted
by the Immigration and Nationality Act, which while regulating aliens in many respects did not
purport to regulate employment matters which are matters of peculiar state concern).
131. See FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142; DeCanas,424 U.S. at 358.
132. E.g., Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 159-60 (1978) (finding partial actual conflict
preemption of Washington State Tanker Law by federal Coast Guard regulations regarding tanker
design and Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972).
In the area of family law, the Court is dedicated to the principle that congressional legislation
will be found to preempt only upon a direct, positive requirement in the federal legislation. See e.g.,
Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 59-60 (1981) (finding federal law displaces state family law only
when in clear conflict); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 232-33 (1981) (holding that federal
retirement benefits displace state family law because of clear direction to that effect); Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1979) (holding Railroad Retirement Act does not preempt family
law absent positive requirement).
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Eventually, though, obstacle implied preemption doctrine continued to operate
as a default doctrine in a wide variety of cases where congressional intent to
preempt could not otherwise be discerned and where the frustration of national
legislative purposes seemed unrelated to a need for national uniformity, as was the
133
genesis of the doctrine in Hines and Rice, but which was not the case in Perez.
The Court continues to refer in passing to the presumption against preemption, but
not when it may matter, as in Perez. The cases begin to contain references to
express preemption though the Court's analysis of such provisions
is as yet quite
1 34
undefined, and restricted to cases involving direct actual conflict.
The Court preserved the operation of state law during the 1960s and 1970s,
more so than in previous decades, as it seemed poised at times to carve out a more
meaningfulplace for the presumption against preemption. 35 As the Court struggled
to find the proper division of state and federal power, its analysis became

increasingly complex as the subjects of regulation become more complex. Many
federal legislative enactments, born of the consumer rights, civil rights, and
environmental movements of the time, would seem to support the conclusion that

national, not local, legislation was the preferred vehicle for addressing those

concerns. 3 6 The preemptive effect of these statutes does not come before the Court
for another decade. During the 1970s the nation focused on getting out of Vietnam
and weathering the Watergate scandals, both of which may have caused many to
lose faith in the ability of those in power not to abuse it, and to seek refuge,
ultimately, in the familiarity of local control. As the more complex regulatory
schemes come before the court in the coming decades, the fundamental tension
between state and federal control of important national issues, and the Court's

133. See generally Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977) (finding a frustration
of purpose behind congressional regulation of consumer protection in product labeling though no
actual conflict and no other evidence of intent to preempt); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 280-82 (1974) (finding that federal labor laws preempt state common law definition
of malice in libel action to the extent state seeks to impose liability based on less than constitutional
actual malice standard); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,649-52 (1971) (holding federalbankruptcy
code preempts state motor vehicle responsibility laws based on frustration of purposes).
As to federal labor law preemption, with which the Court continues to struggle, see also N.Y.
Tel.Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 545-46 (1979) (holding that NLRA and Social
Security Act did not preempt state's power to pay unemployment compensation).
134. Ray, 435 U.S. at 151 (noting direct actual conflict preemption of certain waterways
regulations); Jones,430 U.S. at 519 (stating all Justices agree that no express preemption exists based
on the federal Warehouse, FDCA, and product labeling statutes). There are cases in which Congress
expressly states its intent to entirely dominate the field, as in the case of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
135. See FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141-42; see also City of Burbank v.
Lockheed AirTerminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,643 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing stridently
for stronger presumption against preemption); Jones,430 U.S. at 545-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(same).
136. E.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 - 136y (2000);
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (2000); Federal Cigarette Labeling Act
of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000); Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C §§ 20512084 (2000); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2301-2312 (2000); National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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attitude toward the balance of that control, takes center stage.
D. Preemption Doctrine and a Focus on TraditionalState Authority: The
1980s and 1990s
The Court's cases in the early 1980s continued to apply implied obstacle
preemption doctrine to find preemption in a wide variety of cases, involving
regulations as diverse as the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulations on
abandonment of railroad cars,'37 permissibility of due-on-sale clauses in home
mortgages,'35 and business anti-takeover statutes."39 In immigration and labor cases,
as well, the Court continued its previously articulated implied preemption analysis,

typically finding preemption."'
In the early 1980s, the Court begins in earnest its struggle with the proper

analysis of express preemption provisions, beginning with the preemption provision
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),141 which has a very
specific express preemption provision.1 41 The Court will struggle with ERISA
preemption over the next decades as it continues its struggle with preemption
doctrine generally.
The Court returned to the thorny problem of preemption of common law
14
damages actions in the 1980s. Not since San Diego Building Trades v. Gannon'
in the labor law area in 1959 had the Court addressed the issue. The Court did so

137. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 331-32 (1981)
(holding that a state statute providing cause of action for damages preempted by ICC regulations
permitting abandonment of lines under obstacle implied preemption).
138. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (holding that
Federal Home Loan Board regulations permitting due-on-sale clauses in home mortgages preempted
contrary state doctrine).
139. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,654-55 (1982) (finding that the Illinois business antitakeover statute invalid because of implied conflict with securities laws).
140. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (finding University of Maryland admissions
requirements regarding in-state status preempted by federal immigration laws); Local 926, Int'l Union
of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 678 (1983) (holding NLRB preempts common law
tort action). But see Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 512 (1983) (holding NLRA did not preempt
state law misrepresentation and breach of contract claims by strike replacements against employer).
141. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) provides preemption of "any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA, if it has connection with
or reference to such plan.
143. See Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526
U.S. 358 (1999); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement
v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. I
(1987); Metro. Life Inc. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). Detailed explanation of ERISA
preemption is beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough discussion of ERISA preemption, see
generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, andthe NewJurisprudenceofERISA
Preemption,21 CARDOZO L. REv. 807 (1999); Catherine L. Fisk, The LastArticleAbout the Language
ofERISA Preemption: A Case Study of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996).
144. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. ' Silkwood involved application of the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) 146 to a tort action for personal injuries andproperty damage filed
by Karen Silkwood who had worked at a nuclear power plant operated by KerrMcGee Corp.' 47 Sill-wood became contaminated with plutonium and alleged a
variety of irregularities in the operation of the plant that led to her contamination. 48
She pled negligence and strict liability claims and sought punitive damages.1 49
The AEA was enacted in 1954 to free the nuclear energy industry from total
federal control and to provide for some private involvement in the development of
nuclear power. 5 ' Limited regulatory authority was given to the states, which had
never had any authority over nuclear power."5 The NRC, however, retained
exclusive jurisdiction to license the "transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition,
possession and use of nuclear materials." ' 2 Congress amended the AEA shortly
thereafter to clarify "the respective responsibilities . .. of the States and the
Commission,"' 1 3 and confirmed that the states were precluded from regulating the
safety aspects of nuclear material.5 4 The preemption provision of the AEA, thus,
delineated the limited scope of state authority that was being carved out of
historically federal authority.
The trial court in Silkwood concluded that the AEA did not preempt Silkwood's
action and permitted a jury to find for her on the underlying claim and to award
punitive damages of $10,000,0002 '5 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the preemption decision, concluding based on a "broad preemption analysis" that
"'any state action that competes substantially with the AEC (NRC) in its regulation
of radiation hazards associated with plants handling nuclear material was
' 5 6 Just one year earlier, the Supreme Court in Pacific Gas &
impermissible.""1
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission,5 7 had concluded, after a review of the statutory scheme and the
legislative history, that the AEA "occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States."' s8

145. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
146. Id. at 241 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297h-13 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The AEA
is administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), formerly the Atomic Energy
Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (defining NRC authority).
147. Sillavood, 464 U.S. at 241.
148. Id. at 243. Silkwood was killed in an automobile accident during discovery of the extent
of her contamination and her father brought suit on behalf of her estate. Id. at 242.
149. Id. at 241, 243-45.
150. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284.
151. Pac.Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
205-06 (1983).
152. Id. at 207 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(e),(z),(aa), 2061-2064,2071-2078,2091-2099,21112114).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1); see S. Rep. No. 870 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.A.N. 2872.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 202 1(c)(4).
155. Sillvood, 464 U.S. at 244.
156. Id. at 246 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 923 (10th Cir. 1981)).
157. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
158. Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
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In Silkwood, then, the Court was called on to elaborate on the scope of the state
authority that had been permitted under the AEA, while specifically deciding
whether the availability of traditional damages actions constituted an impermissible
state regulation of nuclear safety concerns. The Court unanimously concluded that
the AEA did not preempt Silkwood's compensatory damages action. 59 A majority
of the Court held that the AEA did not preempt Silkwood's punitive damages claim
either. 60 As to the compensatory damages action, the Justices agreed that such an
award may have an "indirect" impact on a nuclear facility through its primary
purpose to compensate,' 6 ' but because the "Federal Government does not regulate
the compensation ofvictims, and because it is inconceivable that Congress intended
to leave victims with no remedy at all,' 62 the AEA was found not to impliedly
preempt the action for compensatory damages.
The Court, in spite of its strong language to the contrary in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. suggesting the AEA's wide preemptive scope, did not rely on Pacific
Gas & Electric Co.'s occupation of the field preemption analysis. Instead, the
Court, after an additional review of the Act's legislative history, as well as an
assessment of other congressional actions regarding the AEA, 63 was particularly
moved by two pieces of evidence of congressional intent regarding the relationship
between the AEA and state tort law: (1) "It is difficult to believe that Congress
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured
by illegal conduct;"'"' and (2) "[T]he only congressional discussion concerning the
relationship between the Atomic Energy Act and state tort remedies
indicates that
165
Congress assumed that such remedies would be available."'
Silkwood engages in its preemption analysis with these important assumptions
about congressional intent: that Congress would not destroy traditional means of
legal recourse without at least acknowledging it openly, and that, furthermore,
Congress's silence on the topic suggests an assumption that traditional means of
legal recourse indeed would remain. It simply did not occur to the Court at this time
that Congress would intend, impliedly, the destruction of traditional state tort
remedies simply by regulating in the nuclear power field, even though it was a field

159. Sillkvood, 464 U.S. at 251, 263-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 275 (Powell, J., dissenting).

160. Id. at 256.
161. See id. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority opinion).
162. Id. Justice Powell, in dissent, even suggested that "[t]here is no element of regulation when

compensatory damages are awarded, especially when liability is imposed without fault as authorized
by state law." Id. at 276 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 249-51.
164. Id. at 251 (citation omitted). The Court further stated:

Indeed, there is no indication that Congress even seriously considered
precluding the use of such remedies either when it enacted the Atomic Energy
Act in 1954 or when it amended it in 1959. This silence takes on added
significance in light of Congress'[s] failure to provide any federal remedy for
persons injured by such conduct.
Id.
165. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
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fairly requiring comprehensive federal safety standard-setting.166
The Court concluded by recognizing the tension between Congress's
occupation of the field of nuclear safety regulation and permitting state tort law
remedies based on nuclear safety regulation failures. 167 The Court recognized the
inconsistency of its prior finding of a federal occupation of the nuclear regulatory
field with its finding of no preemption in Silkwood.' 61 It concluded, nonetheless,
that the preemption of damages actions is more properly evaluated under implied
conflict or obstacle preemption, and it perceived no conflict or frustration in the
case. 69 Given the Court's prior obstacle preemption cases in whichpreemption had
been so routinely found, Silkwood was quite a departure.17
The Court's disagreement over application of obstacle preemption suggested
the continuing difficulty with that doctrine. Perhaps of greater significance in
Silkwood, though, is how the Justices evaluated the regulatory impact of state tort
law damages actions and assessed Congress's intent regarding that impact. The
disagreement between the Justices on this vital issue came distinctly into focus in
Silkwood. The Court began to line up on both sides of that issue-the one side
represented by the Silkwood majority which recognized the need to provide state
damages remedies despite their incidental regulatory effect, and the other side,

represented by the dissenting opinions, expressing the impropriety ofpermitting a

166. The Court recognized the premise behind the AEA's exclusive regulatory authority in the
NRC to be that
the Commission was more qualified to determine what type of safety standards
should be enacted in this complex area. As Congress was informed by the
[NRC], the 1959 legislation provided for continued federal control over the
more hazardous materials because "the technical safety considerations are of
such complexity that it is not likely that any State would be prepared to deal
with them during the foreseeable future."
Id. at 250 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Court found ample evidence that Congress did not
intend to foreclose state law remedies. Id. at 251.
167. Id. at 256.
168. Id. at249.
169. Id. at 256. The Court provided no citation for this position.
170. The dissenters recognized this. See id. at 258 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, J.), 274 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.). For example, the
dissenting opinions make the case for considering punitive, not compensatory, damages awards to be
regulatory in their effect and, therefore, included within the scope of the nuclear safety regulation in
issue:
The prospect of paying a large fine.., for failure to operate a nuclear facility in
a particular manner has an obvious effect on the safety precautions that nuclear
licensees will follow....
The conduct that the jury's punitive damages award sought to regulate was
the day-to-day safety procedures of nuclear licensees.... Authority for a State
to do so, however, is precisely what the Court held to be pre-empted inPacific
Gas.
Id. at 261 (Blackmun, ., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 283 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the jury can act as a regulatory medium).
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jury to regulate in an area where Congress had already done so.' 7'
During this time, the savings clause, a vehicle Congress used to preserve some
areas of state authority, began to require attention in preemption doctrine, requiring
the Court to focus as it had not before on congressional intent. The Silkwood Court
might be expected to be receptive toward the notion that Congress does not preempt
common law compensatory damages actions absent clear intent to do so,
particularly if a clause in the legislation saves the operation of such actions.
Nonetheless, the Court struggled with such language in a number of cases. The
Court found that a savings clause did not save state wrongful death actions in
Offshore Logistics,Inc. v. Tallentire.'72 The Death on the High Seas Act adopted
a federal wrongful death action for certain maritime deaths, and Congress
specifically saved the operation of state wrongful death actions.' 73 The majority
opinion, which never quoted the statute, considered it inconsistent to preserve state
actions when Congress appeared to be seeking uniformity in this traditionally
federal area of admiralty law.'74
One year after Offshore Logistics, the Court dealt with a more modem savings
clause in InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellete, 7 which presented the preemptive
effect of the Clean Water Act on state common law nuisance actions based on water
pollution. 76 The Court concluded that the Clean Water Act, which has a savings
clause, 77 does not preempt common law nuisance actions so long as they are based
on the law of the State of the source of the pollution. 7 ' Like Silkwood and Offshore
171. Part of the Court's concern with the regulatory effect of punitive damages may also come
from the Court's increasing concern with the constitutional implications ofvery large, unfetteredjury
awards in this area. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257 (1989); see generally 2 DAVID G. OWEN, M.STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN &
OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY §

18:7 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 2

MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS

LIABILITY] (discussing constitutional limits on punitive damages).
172. 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
173. Id. at 227. The Death on the High Seas Act, originally enacted in 1919, has a specific
savings clause which states: "The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action
or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter." 46 U.S.C. app. § 767 (1994). The
majority concludes that this provision saves the jurisdiction of the state courts only and not their
substantive laws. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 222-23. Four dissenters, led by Justice Powell,
argued that the Court paid insufficient attention to the language of the statute in its interpretation of
the preemption provision. Id. at 236-39 (Powell, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 222. As the dissent pointed out, however, while permitting state wrongful death
actions to operate concurrently with a federal action might appear to undercut federal uniformity, "it
is not the role of this Court to reconsider the wisdom of a policy choice that Congress has already
made." Id. at 240 (Powell, J., dissenting).
175. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
176. Id. at 483.
177. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 1999). The savings clauses are found at §§ 1365(e)
and 1370 and state, respectively, that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person or class may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief" and "nothing in this chapter shall ... be construed
as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the
waters (including boundary waters) of such States."
178. Int'l Paper,479 U.S. at 487.
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Logistics, the subject matter in InternationalPaperhad historically been treated as
a matter within the federal domain and not one traditionally occupied by the
states.179 The 1972 amendments to the federal water pollution statutes specifically
provided for a significant State role in preserving natural resources as evidenced by
the savings clauses.'80 Nonetheless, the Court found ambiguity in the language of
the clauses and concluded that "Congress [must not have intended] to undermine
this carefully drawn statute through a general saving clause.''. The Court instead
compromised and concluded that common law actions based only on law of the
source of the pollution are not preempted.'82 This conclusion was based on the
Court's own understanding of the legislative goals of efficiency and predictability
of standards implicit in the vastness of the regulatory scheme, and the Court's belief
that Congress would not have intended to establish "such a chaotic regulatory
structure" as would result if any state whose waterways were affected by pollution
could control a nuisance action.1 3 The Court was struggling with obstacle
preemption doctrine, savings clauses, and discerning (and then believing)
congressional intent.
The 1980s were a schizophrenic time for the Court and its preemption cases.
The potential, from the 1960s, of a narrowly defined obstacle implied preemption,
with a renewed presumption against preemption, was evidenced by Silkwood and
the compromise position in InternationalPaper.In later cases involving obstacle
preemption, the Court found that the state regulatory actions in issue, including
common law and statutory damages actions, did not frustrate the purposes of
Congress, consistent with Silkwood and the notion that common law damages
regulate only indirectly. In English v. GeneralElectric Co.,' 4 for example, the
Court found that the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as it applied to the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, did not preempt plaintiff s state law intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim based on her employer's conduct after she reported safety
violations at defendant's nuclear fuels production facility.'8 5 The Court, consistent
with Silkwood, concluded that while the state emotional distress claim might
indirectly have an effect on safety decisions, this effect was insufficiently

179. Id. at 487-88 (noting that interstate waterpollution issues had been resolved under federal
common law principles).
180. Id. at 489-91. Indeed, the legislative history of the savings clause stated that
."[c]ompliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for
pollution damages."' Id. at 493 n.13 (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). The Court notes also that similar savings clauses were
included verbatim in several other pieces of environmental legislation, permitted the conclusion that
they do not reflect "any considered judgment about what other remedies ... continue to be available."
Id. at 494 n.14 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at500.
183. Id. at 496-97. The Court was influenced by the "elaborate" nature of Congress's
regulatory scheme and, importantly, that under the Court's compromise, the plaintiffs were not left
vithout a remedy given that state common law actions based on the law of the source state were not
preempted. Id. at 497.
184. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
185. Id. at 86.
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substantial to support obstacle preemption. ' The Court stated: "[W]e think the
District Court failed to follow this Court's teaching that 'ordinarily, state causes of
because they impose liability over and above that
action are not pre-empted solely
187
authorized by federal law."",

Similarly, the Court, while exploring the preemptive effect of federal
administrative regulations, concluded in Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Labs, Inc.,'88 that it would be inconsistent with federalism principles to
permit a federal regulatory agency, here, the FDA, to preempt state or local

regulations by simply entering a field, even one Congress had comprehensively

regulated.'89 The Court reiterated the presumption against preemption of health and
safety regulations in its discussion of whether the comprehensiveness ofthe federal
regulatory scheme displayed an intent to preempt. 90 The Court focused on the
specialized function of agencies to work with detail:
Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of pre-emption,
we will pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity
of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend to preempt. . . . [W]e will seldom infer, solely from the
comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt
in its entirety a field related to health and safety.' 9 '
The Court concluded by finding no implied intent to preempt based on obstacle
preemption since there was not "strong evidence" of a threat to federal goals.' 92

186. Id.; see also Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185-186 (1988) (permitting
an additional state workers compensation award against federally governed, but privately-owned,
nuclear facility: "We believe Congress may reasonably determine that incidental regulatory pressure
is acceptable, whereas direct regulatory authority is not") (footnote omitted).
187. English, 496 U.S. at 89 (quoting California v. ARC Am.Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989),
where the Court concluded that state antitrust actions benefitting indirect purchasers could proceed,
notwithstanding a federal rule limiting antitrust recovery to direct purchasers, because, in spite of a
possible indirect effect on the operation of federal antitrust laws, no preemption exists solely because
state liability is greater than federal liability); see also Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480
U.S. 572, 593 (1987) (finding no implied obstacle preemption under variety of federal land use
statutes, forest service regulations, and Coastal Zone Management Act where Congress's intent to
prohibit States permitting authority not demonstrated in the independent or combined regulations).
188. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
189. Id. at 717.
190. Id. at 715.
191. Id. at 718.
192. Id. at 721. The record did not support a finding of a threat to the adequacy of the plasma
supply or that the federal standards were intended to be anything other than a minimum. Id. at 721-22.
But see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (applying implied
obstacle preemption to patent issue when the "strong federal policy favoring free competition in
ideas" not meriting patent protection preempted a state statute which substantially interfered with
enjoyment of un-patented design concept).
The Court continues to apply occupation of the field preemption, though in a narrow category
of cases. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 (1988) (quoting N. Natural Gas
Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1963)) (explaining that the Natural Gas Act so
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Given that in prior years the Court had regularly found implied obstacle
preemption, the Court's contrary finding during the 1980s can perhaps fairly be
explained as a reflection of the general desire to place regulatory authority in the
hands of the states absent strong congressional intent to the contrary. 93 As the
Court continued to explore the complexity of modem statutory schemes, and
applied its modem preemption doctrine to old statutory schemes, the cases forced
the Court's doctrine to go places it had not been before. The Court, at this time,
seemed serious about its dedication to impliedly preempt based only upon clearly
manifest congressional intent. Indeed, it was also during this time that express
preemption provisions began to receive the Court's serious attention.194
E.

The Focus 1on
Express Preemption Doctrine and Cipollone v. Liggett
95
Group, Inc.

While federal statutes had always been interpreted to determine their
preemptive scope, typically those statutes did not indicate clear enough intent to
preempt so that implied preemption doctrine was utilized to determine the statute's
preemptive scope. Rarely had federal statutes or administrative regulations directly
addressed their preemptive effect and, when they did, the Court often found the
provisions to be ambiguous and, thus, requiring the application of implied
preemption principles anyway. Consequently, express preemption analysis was
rarely used successfully to preempt state law, much less common law damages
actions.

dominated the field that Congress intended to occupy the field of regulation of natural gas companies
even though "collision between [S]tate and federal regulation may not be inevitable"); California v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490, 496-99 (1990) (noting that the Federal Power Act
of 1935 gives federal government broad role in promoting hydroelectric power and severely limits
operation of state regulation).
193. For evidence of this general political desire see Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg.
41,685 (Oct. 26, 2987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 478 (1988) (President Reagan issued
order to federal agencies to construe regulations to preempt state law "only when statute has express
preemption provision or other palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that Congress intended
premption").
194. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (holding that provisions
in Federal Fungicide, Insecticide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not expressly preempt local
regulation of pesticide use; thorough assessment of text and legislative history revealed no implied
preemptive intent). In discussing the use of legislative history to define intent and a reliance instead
on the text, Justice Scalia, in concurrence, noted that terms of statute alone do not manifest intent to
preempt: "[The Wisconsin Supreme Court's] only mistake was failing to recognize how unreliable
Committee Reports are-not only as a genuine indicator of congressional intent but as a safepredictor
ofjudicial construction. We use them when it is convenient, and ignore them when it is not." Id. at
617 (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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In the 1980s, as a "crisis" in the liability system was increasingly bemoaned,
more and more defendants in products liability actions sought total protection from
liability based on the supremacy of federal regulation. Compliance with
governmental regulations has always been relevant to the exercise of due care in
tort actions, but it has never strictly been its measure 9 7 and the same is true for
proof of product defect in strict tort liability actions.'98 Consequently, defendants
had rarely been successful in arguing that the existence of a federal statutory
standard totally preempted the plaintiffs state law based allegations of
defectiveness or negligence 99 Typically, regulations which contain standards of
conduct do not address their preemptive scope, and it can be said with some
certainty that one reason for such failure is that such standards are expected to state
minimum and not maximum standards.200 Even in 1991, the general consensus was
that "[t]he general approach to tort claims against non-federal actors,.., is to deny
any preemptive or shielding effect unless there20 is some specific indication of a
congressional intent to preempt state tort law.", '
In the mid-1980s, the Court addressed a limited number of other products
liability matters, reflecting a general bias in favor of limited tort liability.2 2 The
Court's preemption doctrine and its restrictive approach to products liability would
collide in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,20 3 involving interpretation of the
preemptive effect of the federal cigarette labeling and advertising laws on cigarette

196. SeegenerallyAMERICANLAwINSTITUTEREPORTERS' STuDY, 1ENTERPRISERESPONSIBILITY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 3, 266-70 (1991) (describing prevailing
sentiment in the 1980s that something was "seriously amiss" in the tort regime and discussing
significant increase in product liability case filings since 1975) [hereinafter I ALI ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY REPORTERS' STUDY].

197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 288C (1964); see generallyW. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,

§ 36, at 233 (5th ed. 1984); 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON
§ 27:7; Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 176,

ProductsLiability, 88 GEO.L. J.2049 passim (2000).
198. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)oFTORTS: PRODUCTSLIABILITY § 4(b) (1998); 2 MADDEN& OWEN
ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 17 1, § 27:7.
199. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS' STUDY, 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONALINJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 84 (1991) [hereinafter 2 ALl
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY REPORTERS' STUDY].

200. Id. at 91 ("Statutory preclusion of tort remedies is, however, a politically controversial
topic: most regulatory statutes do not even address the issue. Many regulatory statutes contain
provisions saving common law remedies.").
201. Id. at94 & n.27.
202. See Mary J.Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility,31 WAKE
FORESTL. REv. 1075 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court's products liability cases in the 1980s,
particularly East River S.S. Corp. v. TransamericaDelaval,Inc., and Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
both of which limited the reach of tort liability in cases involving federal matters). A more recent
discussion of this topic is found in this Symposium by Professor Anita Bernstein. See Anita
Bernstein, Products Liability in the United States Supreme Court: A Venture in Memory of Gary
Schwartz, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1193, 1200-08 (2002).
203. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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products liability actions.2" In Cipollone, the Court appeared to provide much
needed clarity to preemption analysis by providing that when Congress had
expressed the preemptive scope of a statute, and that provision provided a "'reliable
indicium of congressional intent,"'"" 5 the express preemption provision controlled.
The Court emphasized the presumption against federal preemption of matters
historically within the states' police powers, and focused on discerning
congressional intent.0 5 Cipollone's focus on the cigarette-labeling laws express
preemption provisions is not surprising in light of the turmoil in preemption
analysis in the 1980s and the quest for a limited role for implied obstacle
preemption to preserve state authority.
All the Justices in Cipollone agreed that the preemption analysis should
proceed by an interpretation of the scope of the express preemption provision. 7
Only a plurality of Justices agreed on how to interpret the particular preemption

provisions in question, whether narrowly, based on the presumption against
preemption, or facially based on the text alone. 0 8 The primary focus of all the
opinions in Cipollone,therefore, was on how to determine the scope of the express
preemption provisions.2The Court relied on two cases for this proposition which
interpreted very specific express preemption provisions: Malone v. White Motor
Corp.,21 one of the first cases interpreting the all-encompassing ERISA preemption
provision, and CaliforniaFederalSavings & LoanAss 'n. v. Guerra,2 ' interpreting
an express anti-preemption provision from Title XI of the Civil Rights Act which
very clearly expressed an intent not to preempt state employment practices absent

204. See also Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965, amended by Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
205. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 516.
207. Id. at 516-17, 531 (Blackmaum, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part), 545-46
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
evaluated the express preemption provisions and concluded they did not include common law
damages actions, but it then concluded that state common law damages actions were impliedly
preempted because of the federal interest in uniformity. Id. at 511 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986)) ("Congress'[s] 'carefully drawn balance between the
purposes of warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the interests of
national economy' would be upset by state-law damages actions based on noncompliance with
'warning, advertisement, and promotion obligations other than those prescribed in the [federal]
Act."') (alteration in original).
208. Id. at 523, 534-39 (Blacknum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 544 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Cipollone,505 U.S. at 517. The Court stated:
Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est
exclusio allerius: Congress'[s] enactment of a provision defining the
pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
pre-empted. In this case, the other provisions of the 1965 and 1969 Acts offer
no cause to look beyond § 5 of each Act. Therefore, we need only identify the
domain expressly pre-empted by each of those sections.
Id.
210. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
211. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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an actual conflict.212 Neither case involved preemption of common law damages
actions.
The Court does not refer to its cases interpreting express preemption provisions
as related to common law damages actions, 213 or its cases applying implied obstacle
preemption doctrine regarding common law damages actions." 4 In Cipollone, the
Court acknowledged the presumption against preemption and relied on it to require
a fair but narrow reading of an express preemption provision."' Cipollone was
doomed to be a blip on the radar screen of preemption because of this attempt to
apply the presumption of preemption in a meaningful way. Given the Court's
restrictive approach to products liability matters, and the history of broadly applied
obstacle implied preemption analysis, the demise of Cipollone and its focus on
express preemption was just a matter of time.
The plurality opinion used both the text of the provisions and the legislative
history to preempt some, but not all, common law damages actions imposing

liability. 21 6 The plurality opinion parsed the language of the preemption

provisions217 with particularity to conclude that the statute's preemption of
"requirements or prohibitions imposed under State law" preempted certain common
law causes of action, as well as positive enactments, based on cigarette advertising
or promotion.2 8 The plurality concluded that the statute "plainly reaches beyond
such [positive] enactments,"2 9 reiterating its position from Garmon that common
law damages actions can have an indirect regulatory effect. Four Justices in the
plurality found partial preemption of those damages actions whose predicate is a

"requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health."22

212. Id. at 282, 295 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing preemption provision as an antipreemption provision because it operates to preserve state law, not prohibit it).
213. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Co. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (dealing with workers'
compensation safety standards as preempted by federal regulation of nuclear power facility); Int'l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (interpreting preemption of common law nuisance action
under Clean Water Act preemption provisions).
214. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238 (1984).
215. Cipollone,505 U.S. at 518, 523. But the Court has so often bandied about the buzz words
of preemption that there is support in its cases for just about any proposition. Id. at 532-33
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. at 521-24 (discussing the change to preemption provision from 1965 Act to 1969 Act
and effect on interpretation ofprovision to preempt more broadly).
217. The 1965 Act's preemption provision stated that "'No statement relating to smoking and
health shall be required [on cigarette packages or in advertising]."' Id. at 518 (citations omitted). The
1969 Act changed the preemption provision slightly to state that "[n]o requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law" regarding cigarette labeling or
advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000). The use of the phrase "requirement or prohibition" was
critical to the Court's analysis of whether common law damages actions were prohibited. Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 522-24.
218. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
219. Id. at 521. "The phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily
encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules." Id.
220. Id. at 524.
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Cipollone gave the Justices an opportunity to revisit their disagreement over the
regulatory effect of common law damages actions. Justice Blackmun disagreed
vehemently with the conclusion that common law damages actions necessarily are
precluded under the statute because they constitute some general "requirement or
prohibition."'" Indeed, Justice Blackmun recognized that the Court's earlier cases
assessing preemption of common law damages actions "have declined on several
recent occasions to find the regulatory effects of state tort law direct or substantial
enough to warrant preemption."' Cipollone marks an important move away from
the somewhat solicitous treatment of common law damages actions within
preemption analysis that had only recently been the Court's approach, evidenced
by Silkwood, Ouellette, and English.
In its next preemption case, the Court analyzed the express preemption
provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA)
which provides that states may not maintain "motor vehicle safety standards" which
conflict -with federal performance standards on the same topic. 4 In Freightliner
Corp. v Myrick,22 the Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Thomas,
concluded that since there was no federal standard in issue on the topic of anti-lock
brakes for eighteen-wheel trucks, there was no express or implied preemption of
state design defect claims based on the absence of such brakes. 6 The Court did not
reach the question of whether the Act would preempt such claims if a federal
standard did exist, but, in the course of its opinion, the Court raised a question about
the scope of Cipollone's express preemption analysis:
The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of
statute
"implies"--i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that
a
Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean
that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of
implied pre-emption.... At best, Cipollonesupports an inference

221. Id. at 536 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmum
stated:
More important, the question whether common-law damages actions exert
a regulatory effect on manufacturers analogous to that ofpositive enactments...
is significantly more complicated than the plurality's brief quotation from San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon ... would suggest.
The effect of tort law on a manufacturer's behavior is necessarily indirect.
Id. (citation omitted).
222. Id. at 537 (Blackmum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referencing Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller,486 U.S. 174 (1988); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) and
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)).
223. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15
U.S.C.§ 1381 et.seq. (1988) (current version at49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).

224. Id. §§ 30101, 30103(b).
225. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
226. Id. at 289-90.
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that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied preemption; it does not establish a rule.

7

Myrick was a unanimous opinion, foreshadowing the limited usefulness of
Cipolloneand the resurrection of implied preemption doctrine. The reason for the
short life of express preemption analysis' exclusivity may never be known, but the
Court's subsequent cases on this issue reflect, as will be seen, an unwillingness by
the Court to believe that Congress says what it means. The Court's skepticism in
this important matter of discerning Congress's intent makes the Court's own
motives in the assessment of implied obstacle preemption suspect.
The Court's next preemption opinion, Medtronic,Inc. v. Lohr,22' involved the

Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) pre-market notification approval
regulations under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) and whether
those regulations preempted common law design and manufacturing defect claims
arising out of plaintiff's use of defendant's pacemaker which had been approved
under the FDA requirements.229 The Court was divided on whether the MDA

preempted the plaintiffs claims, but again, all Justices agreed that the express
preemption provision controlled the analysis."
The Justices again stuck closely to the language of the express preemption
provision, which stated that states may not impose "requirement[s] ... different
from or in addition to" any federal requirement related to safety or effectiveness
included in a federal requirement." The device in question had been approved
under the pre-market notification method which did not include specific design
requirements. 2 The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stevens who wrote the
Cipolloneplurality opinion, concluded that common law damage actions based on
design defects were not requirements in this context. 3

227. Id. at 288-89; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 662 (1993)
(finding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act does not preempt state common law damages actions;
preemption provision specifically exempts concurring, non-conflicting, state regulations from its
operation: "Even after federal standards have been promulgated, the States may adopt more stringent
safety requirements 'when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard,' ifthose
standards are 'not incompatible with' federal laws or regulations and not an undue burden on
interstate commerce.").
228. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
229. Id. at 474.
230. Id. at 484-85, 503-05 (Breyer, J., concurring), 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens' plurality opinion suggested that actual conflict implied
preemption analysis may be appropriate in certain circumstances even when an express preemption
provision was in issue, and cited FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick. Id. at 503.
231. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000).
232. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 480. This pre-market notification requirement, also known as the
510k notification process, permitted marketing of devices that were substantially equivalent to a
device already on the market and did not contain the same rigor of the pre-market approval process
that new devices to the market were required to undergo. See id. at 476-80 (describing the processes
and their differences). See generally, Ausness, supra note 3, at 226-27; SusAN BARTLETT FOOTE,
MANAGING THE MEDICAL ARMs RACE: PUBLIC POLICY AND MEDICAL DEVICE INNOVATION (1992).
233. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 493-94.
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Justice Stevens reiterated the express preemption analysis articulated in
Cipollone:
[W]e have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt statelaw causes of action.... [W]e "start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."... [W]e used
a "presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations"
to support a narrow interpretation of such an express command in
Cipollone.... That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns
and the234historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and
safety.

The plurality found no preemption of any of plaintiff's claims by interpreting the
scope of the statute and governing FDA regulations narrowly, using the legislative
history and the FDA's own interpretation against preemption as support.2 5
A majority of the Justices, four in dissent and Justice Breyer in concurrence,
considered that common law damages actions generally do impose requirements
and therefore are preempted under the statute if they differ from a federal
requirement. 6 Justice Breyer's concurring opinion gave the Court its judgment in
the case.

7

Justice Breyerwouldhave interpreted the word "requirement" to include

common law damages actions in particular circumstances."' More importantly,
Justice Breyer confirmed the importance of congressional intent in determining the
statute's preemptive scope and complained ofthe "highly ambiguous" nature of the
preemption provision in issue, requiring that courts look elsewhere for help as to
"just which federal requirements preempt just which state requirements, as well as
just how they might do so. '"" 9 Justice Breyer stated that express preemption
provisions should be interpreted based on their "clear congressional command," if
one exists. If none exists, courts may infer that the "relevant administrative agency
possess a degree of leeway" to proscribe preemptive effect of its regulations.2 4
Justice Breyer's frustration over Congress's inability to state unambiguously the
scope of preemption provisions, and his obvious dissatisfaction with the task of
interpreting ambiguous language, foreshadows the Court's return to a focus on

234. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 488-89.
236. Id. at 503 (Breyer, J., concurring), 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). It is interesting that the Justices that find common law damages actions to be regulatory,
imposing requirements on persons against whom liability is found, do not cite Silkwood, or English,
which found such regulatory effect to be indirect only. Rather, they cite Garmon from 1959 which
involved preemption of state court jurisdiction under the NLRA and not, technically, the damages
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
action which supported it. Id. at 509-14 (O'Connor, J.,
237. Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 503-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
239. Medtronic,518 U.S. at 505 (Breyer, J., concurring).
240. Id.
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implied preemption doctrine.241 Justice O'Connor, in dissent, relies on the statutory
text, "[B]ecause Congress has expressly provided a preemption provision, 'we need
not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MIA to
preempt' state law." 2 The only question remained one of statutory interpretation,
which she conducted by textual analysis.'

Commentators have observed that the Court's preemption analysis after
Cipollone, Myrick and Medtronic, was less and less a true express preemption
analysis and more and more a veiled implied preemption analysis.2" But in Norfolk
& Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin,2" the Court continued its reliance on express
preemption provisions,246 this time under the Federal Railroad Safety Act.247 The

preemption provision states that "[1laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad
safety shall be nationally uniformto the extent practicable,"248 recognizing that state
and local regulations may be necessary to insure that specific local needs are met.
A state may regulate in an area, therefore, until the Secretary of Transportation
prescribes a regulation; then the State is ousted from authority.
The Secretary of Transportation had made funds available for installing
warnings at railway crossings and promulgated regulations regarding the adequacy

of some, but not all, warning devices installed with federal funds. 249 Plaintiff was
injured at a railroad crossing where warning signs were installed with federal funds
which had been approved as part of several projects in Tennessee by the Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA), but no particularized finding of warnings

adequacy for the crossing had been made."s Plaintiff argued that the inadequacy of
the warnings supported a negligence action regardless of the general federal

241. The Court decided a number of other preemption cases during the mid-1990s which
seemed not to involve quite the struggle that the preemption of products liability cases did. E.g.,
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act which places
regulation ofinsurance in state domain did not prevent operation of other federal laws, such as RICO,
on insurers where that federal law does not directly conflict with state regulation or would not
frustrate state policy); Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213 (1997) (finding that the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which defines a gross
negligence standard for directors and officers, provides only a floor, not a ceiling, and does not
prevent stricter state standard; no express preemption provision in issue).
The Court's ERISA preemption cases, though, continue to raise thorny issues under the
express preemption provision. E.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (finding that ERISA
does not reach HMO liability); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (finding California wage law not preempted by ERISA); Boggs v.
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) (holding that ERISA preempts state community property laws).
242. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
243. Id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor was joined
by the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id.
244. E.g., Raeker-Jordan, supra note 2, at 1418-19.
245. 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
246. Id. at 347-48, 352-56.
247. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,49 U.S.C. §§ 20101- 20153 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
248. Id. § 20106.
249. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 348-49 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) (1999)).
250. Id. at 350.
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approval of the warnings." 1
The Court found that the federal regulatory scheme regarding railroad crossings
expressly preempted the damages action because the crossing warnings were
installed with federal funds, under FHWA approval and, therefore, the federal
regulations "substantially subsumed" the subject matter consistent with the express
preemption provision. 2 While adequacy of the warning sign had not been
explored, the approval of the FHWA and the subsequent funding defeated any
adequacy argument because of the plain meaning of the statute and its
regulations. 3 The expressed desire for national uniformity in the railroad
regulatory area certainly affected the Court's conclusion. The result appears at
odds with the presumption against preemption, however, as applied with some
dedication in Medtronic and Cipollone.Y
II. MODERN PREEMPTION DOCTRiNE
The Court's struggle with express preemption and its meaningful search for
congressional intent based on Congress's express language was soon to be
resolved. One year later, the Court had an opportunity to clarify its express
preemption analysis and the interpretive methods to be used under that analysis. In
Geier v. American HondaMotor Co.," 5 the Court did not do so; rather, the Court
failed to apply either a text-based statutory interpretation or a text-plus legislative
history/administrative regulation guided interpretive approach. Geier represents the
Court's first effort since Ouellette,involving the Clean Water Act,157 at interpreting
a savings clause, and certainly the first effort at interpreting such a clause under its
focus on express preemption. Whether the Court will continue to focus on express
language in an effort to discern congressional intent is no longer a question after

251. Id.
252. Id. at 356, 358-59.
253. This result is entirely inconsistent with the traditional rule that compliance with
government regulations is some evidence of due care, but not conclusive, particularly because the
federal approval in this instance is devoid of any actual finding of adequacy or reasonableness.
254. For a discussion of the historically broad preemptive scope given to federal regulation of
the railroad industry, see supranotes 36-43 and accompanying text.
255. The FHWA had supported the Court's reading of the preemptive scope of the statute in
an earlier case, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), but changed its position in
Shanklin, which appeared to the Court to be contrary to the regulation's plain text. See Shanklin, 529
U.S. at 355-56, 359-60 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the federal government can change the
preemption it previously sought by changing its regulation "to achieve the commonsense result the
Government itself now seeks").
256. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). Geier was a five to four opinion; Justice Breyer wrote for the
majority, and was joined by Chief Justice Relnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
Justice Stevens, the author of both the Cipollone and Medtronic plurality opinions, dissented in an
opinion in which Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsbergjoined. The only surprise here is that Justice
Thomas, who wrote the Myrick opinion and who sided with Justice O'Connor in her dissent in
Medtronic, which would have found express preemption there, joined Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion.
257. See discussion supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
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Geier-implied obstacle preemption void of any effort to discern congressional
intent and reminiscent of the railroad cases of the 1910s has returned.
A.

The New ImpliedPreemptionDoctrine: Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co.

In Geier, the Court was asked to analyze the effect of the express preemption
provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA)28 on
a lawsuit alleging that a 1987 Honda was defective in design because it did not have
a driver's side air bag.25 9 The NTMVSA contains a preemption provision, at issue
in Myrick also, which states that whenever a federal motor vehicle safety standard,
which is defined elsewhere in the statute as a minimum safety standard,26 is in
effect, states may not establish or continue any "safety standard applicable to the
same aspect of performance" which is not identical to the federal standard.26' The
statute also provides the following "savings clause:" "Compliance with a motor
vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from
liability at common law.""26
The Department of Transportation issued a federal motor vehicle safety
standard (FMVSS) in 1984, after a tortured administrative history, which permitted
automobile manufacturers beginning in 1987 a choice of passive restraints,
culminating in the requirement in 1989 that all cars have a drivers side air bag.263
Ms. Geier's 1987 Honda did not have a drivers side airbag.'" The Court concluded
that the express preemption provision did not preempt plaintiffs action,265 but it
conducted no textual analysis of the statute's language. The Court also concluded
that the savings clause did not save the plaintiff s common law damages action, but
that "ordinary pre-emption" principles apply so that the action is preempted because
it "conflicts with the objectives of FMVSS 208. ''266

Justice Breyer, who complained of the ambiguity in the preemption provision
of the MDA in Medtronic, wrote for the majority in Geier, and articulated a threepart preemption analysis. First, does the express preemption provision pre-empt the

258. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
259. Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-65.
260. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9) (stating that a safety standard is a "minimum standard for motor
vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance").
261. Id. § 30103(b)(1).
262. Id§ 30103(e).
263. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984) (referred to as Standard 208). For a discussion of the tortured
administrative history, see Geier,529 U.S. at 875-77, 889-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Ralph
Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with FederalStandards,64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415 (1996).
264. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
265. Id. at 867.
266. Id. at 866.
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lawsuit?2' If not, "do ordinary pre-emption principles nonetheless apply?" 268 If so,
does the lawsuit "actually conflict" with the federal statute? 269 Of primary
importance is how the Court used the notion of "actual conflict" preemption very
broadly to include not only actual conflict but obstacle preemption as well. Because
the Court did not interpret the scope of the express preemption provision, it
concluded that "ordinary," also known as "implied," preemption principles continue
to apply, relegating Cipollone and Medtronic to a footnote in the history of
preemption doctrine.270
The majority's analysis of the express preemption provision and the savings
clause is disappointing in two ways. First, there is no meaningful analysis of the
scope of the provision's language, in the way that the Court engaged in such an
analysis in Cipollone and Medtronic. Consequently, the Court fails to clarify the
manner by which such provisions are to be interpreted, whether narrowly as in
Cipollone or by reference to legislative and administrative history. Second, the
Court's interpretation of the meaning of the savings clause is inconsistent with its
analysis of such clauses in its prior cases; indeed the Court does not even refer to
any such cases.
The Court does not discuss the language of the NTMVSA preemption
provision to determine its scope-for example, what does "standard" mean in the
context of the statute, its legislative history, and purpose. Nor does the Court assess
what the use of "standard," as opposed to "requirement" or some other term, means,
as it did in Cipollone and Medtronic. Instead, the Court concludes, with little
fanfare, that the "savings clause" makes that exercise unnecessary. 27' The Court
says that it does not matter whether "standard" should be read to include common
law damages actions because the savings clause assumes "that there are some
significant number of common-law liability cases to save." 272 The Court thus
concludes that the presence of the savings clause requires a narrow reading of the
express preemption provision, excluding common law damages actions from its
operation, to give actual meaning to the savings clause.273
Had the Court engaged in a textual analysis, it would have seen that "standard"
is defined in the statute as a "minimum," giving some indication of what Congress
intended under the preemption clause. 274 The legislation consciously uses "liability

267. Id. at 867.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886.
271. See id. at 868-74.
272. Id. at 868
273. Id.
274. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9). The references to "safety standard" in these sections, definitions
and preemptive effect, are so distinctly different from the use of"liability under common law" in the
savings clause that it is clear on the face of the statute that the two terms describe different concepts.
See Nader & Page, supra note 267, at 419-25 (giving a thorough legislative history of NTMVSA
provisions; assessment of statutory provisions "leads inexorably to the conclusion that [the savings
clause] was meant to preserve the possibility of automaker liability in tort despite compliance with
a federal standard").
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under common law" in the savings clause in a very different way from "standard,"
suggesting that the preemption provision is limited to legislatively or
administratively enacted positive features of automotive performance. The savings
clause, then, would logically mean that even if an entity complied with the federal
standard, which is a minimum, a common law action based on that compliance
would be permitted nonetheless.
The Court's failure to assess the language of these two provisions consistently
with one another, based on their plain meaning, is at the least, curious and, at the
most, directly contrary to controlling precedent.275 The Court turns to the savings
clause, without focusing on its language, and asks whether it forecloses the
operation of ordinary preemption principles. One of those principles, of course, is
that we seek the intent of Congress and, where it is clearly expressed, that language
serves to define the inquiry.276 The majority opinion never mentions the
presumption against preemption. 7 Indeed, the Court suggests that a broad reading
of the preemption provision in issue might be appropriate in some circumstances,
but that "[w]e have found no convincing indication that Congress wanted to
preempt not only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort
actions."27 The Court uses the existence of the savings clause as its sole support for
this conclusion. The Court relies on the savings clause to assist in the interpretation
of the preemption provision and speaks in terms of"possible" broad interpretations,
which it concludes are not correct,279 rather than interpreting the language, history,
and purpose of the provisions.
The Court does not refer to the legislative history nor to the purposes of the
statute in its express preemption analysis. Perhaps this is to be expected of a Court
that tends toward text-based construction of statutes, as in CipolloneandMedtronic.
That makes all the more puzzling the majority's inadequate interpretation of the
statute as written.28 °
In Geier, Justice Breyer complained about the highly ambiguous nature of
many congressional preemption provisions, yet in the face of a seemingly
unambiguous statute, he raises questions about Congress's purposes, saying: "It is
difficult to understand why Congress would have insisted on a compliance-with-

275. Geier,529 U.S. at 867-68 "[W]e need not determine the precise significance of the use of

the word 'standard,' rather than 'requirement,' however, for the Act contains another provision,
which resolves the disagreement.... The saving clause assumes there are some significant number
of common-law liability cases to save." Id.
276. See supra Part III.A.
277. In United States v. Locke, decided a few months earlier in the same term, the Court
elaborates at length on the "assumption ofnonpreemption" which is not triggered when the regulation
in issue is in an area of"ofsignificant federal presence," but which operates in areas ofhistorical state
regulation. 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) and
Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)).

278. Geier,529 U.S. at 868.
279. Id.

280. In Locke, the Court interpreted the preemptive scope of a savings clause in the Oil
Pollution Act and did so based on a text-based interpretation significantly more detailed than that in
Geier. Locke, 529 U.S. at 106-07. Locke was a unanimous opinion.
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federal-regulationpreconditionto the provision's applicability had it wished the Act
to 'save' all state-law tort actions, regardless of their potential threat to the
objectives offederal safety standardspromulgated under the Act.",281 It is not
difficult at all to understand why Congress would write a savings clause in a way
that focuses on only those who comply with the federal regulation: because those
who do not comply have no claim to federal protection in the first place. Congress
can choose to provide that those who have obeyed a minimum federal requirement
are, nonetheless, unprotected from traditional principles of common law
compensation mechanisms. Indeed, as the Justices on many occasions have
observed, the Court's
task is to follow the intent of a congressional direction, not
2
to re-write it.
The Court stated in its analysis of the express preemption provision that it was
not going to determine whether use of the word "standard" as opposed to
"requiremenf' defined preemptive scope?" and now we know why: "ordinary
preemption principles" apply regardless of the scope of the express provision. The
Court's prior preemption cases had been badly splintered on the nature of express
provision analysis so it is not surprising that the Court would retreat to more
familiar territory with application ofimpliedpreemption principles. If the Court had
concluded that "standard" does not include common law damages actions in
NTMVSA, it could not then easily have concluded, in the face of its purported
focus on congressional intent, that the statute's purposes would be frustrated by
permitting such actions. Further, if the Court had concluded that "standard" does
include common law damages actions, then the savings clause may more clearly
mean that Congress intended a narrow preemption and, thus, an implied preemption
argument would seem an end-run around Congress's intent. So what did the Court
do? It found ambiguity in the express preemption provision and failed to conduct
the very analysis it had defined only eight short years earlier in Cipollone. It
resurrected implied obstacle preemption doctrine shortly after its attempt to limit it
in an effort to preserve traditional state authority.
One important explanation for this shift in preemption doctrine must be that the
Court's distrust of products liability actions is greater than its interest in determining
congressional intent or preserving traditional state authority.284 For example, Justice

281. Geier,529 U.S. at 869-70 (emphasis added). After concluding that the savings clause
removes common law tort actions from the operation of the express preemption provision, the Court
concludes that nothing in the language of the clause suggests an intent to save state law tort actions
that conflict with federal regulations. Id. at 868-69. One might wonder why Congress would need to
save state law tort actions that do not conflict with federal regulations when state law tort actions that
do not conflict with federal regulations are not covered by the federal regulation to begin with? Why
would Congress write a savings clause to save something that does not need saving?
282. See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 240 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("lilt is not the role of this Court to reconsider the wisdom of a policy choice that Congress has

already made.").
283. Geier, 529 U.S. at 867.

284. See Davis, supra note 202, at 1081-1139 (explaining the Court's products liability cases
in the 1980s and early 1990s which evince a desire to retract common law products liability
doctrines).
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Breyer, for the majority, goes on at length about the regulatory effect of 'juryimposed safety standards" yet his analysis of the express preemption provision has
no hint of what "standard" means.2 85 The majority relies on the "careful regulatory
scheme" established under NTMVSA to support the operation of implied
preemption principles, while recognizing that Congress intended there to be some
nonuniformity in the system it created. 6 The Court's distrust of common law
damages actions in the regulatory sphere is apparent:
Insofar as petitioners' argument would permit common-law
actions that "actually conflict" with federal regulations, it would
take from those who would enforce a federal law the very ability
to achieve the law's congressionally mandated objectives that the
Constitution, through the operation of ordinary pre-emption
principles, seeks to protect. To the extent that such an
interpretation of the saving provision reads into a particular
federal law toleration of a conflict that those principles would
otherwise forbid, it permits that law to defeat its own objectives,
or potentially,
as the Court has put it before, to "'destroy
287
itself.'

For this proposition, the Court cites a case decided in 1907 when the Court's
preemption analysis was in its youth and when the Court was faced with
congressional legislation entirely different from that it faces now.288 In addition, the
NTMVSA was written in 1966 when the operation of widely endorsed tort
principles uniformly permitted tort actions to proceed even when the defendant
complied with federal or state safety regulations. It is not unexpected that a
Congress writing at that time would anticipate that such a long-standing rule would
operate, and might even want to insure that it did.
But the Court concludes that the two provisions reflect a neutral policy toward
the operation of implied preemption doctrine when an actual conflict exists. 8 9 Yet,
when the Court applies implied preemption doctrine, it is obstacle implied
preemption that it applies-that version that is unrelated to congressional intent, but
rather is based on a general judicially-determined frustration of national purposes.
The Court describes its precedent as defining only "terminological" differences in
implied preemption categories, and "it has assumed that Congress would not want
either kind of conflict., 290 The Court, thus,

285. Geier, 529 U.S. at 871.
286. Id. at 870.
287. Id. at 872 (citation omitted).
288. Id. (citing AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998) (involving rate dispute
under federal Communications Act); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907) (involving railroad freight rate dispute).
289. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870-71.
290. Id. at 87 3.
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sees no grounds, then, for attempting to distinguish among types
of federal-state conflict for purposes of analyzing whether such a
conflict warrants pre-emption in a particular case. That kind of
analysis, moreover would engender legal uncertainty with its
inevitable systemwide costs . . . as courts tried sensibly to

distinguish among varieties of "conflict".. .when applying this
complicated rule to the many federal statutes that contain some
form of an express preemption provision, a savings provision, or
as here, both.2 1
The majority specifically rejects any "special burden" on the proponent of
implied preemption to make the necessary showing of frustration of federal
objectives, but it does not describe what the required showing is. 2 Such a burden
would seem to make sense ifa party were trying to overcome a presumption against
preemption. But the Court clearly is uninterested in that presumption. Nowhere is
there a discussion of the history of the preemption provision or savings clause, or
the legislative history or objectives of the federal statute under which the regulation
was promulgated.293 The Court in Geierpointed instead to the balancing of a wide

291. Id. at 874. The Court found an actual conflict, elaborating at length about the frustration
of purpose that would result if the common law tort action were permitted to proceed. Id. at 874- 86.
The Court relies for its conclusion on the history of the 1980s era federal regulation and the
Department of Transportation's comments on the purposes behind the regulation, a moving target at
best and one certainly not tied to the statute's legislative history. See id. at 877-86. It has been
persuasively argued that congressional intent in the area of motor vehicle safety has always been to
permit the parallel operation of state common law to fulfill the federal objective of public safety. See
Nader & Page, supranote 263, at 419-26.
292. The idea of a "special burden" stems from Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in which
he had argued that even if implied preemption doctrine somehow survives the express preemption
analysis, the Court's application of obstacle preemption analysis is vastly over-broad given the
existence ofthe express preemptionprovisions andtheprotractedpolitical nature ofthe administrative
process which produced FMVSS 208. Geier, 529 U.S. at 898-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens suggests that in the face of such express provisions, the Safety Act imposes a "special burden
on a party relying on an arguable, implicit conflict with a temporary regulatory policy-rather than
a conflict with congressional policy or with the text ofany regulation-to demonstrate that a common
law claim has been pre-empted." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also comments on the fundamental nature of the case being "about federalism, that
is, about respect for 'the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities."' Id. at 887. (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also comments: "[lit is equally clear that the Supremacy Clause does
not give unelected federal judges carte blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their own
ideas of tort reform on the States." Id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. See Geier,529 U.S. at 910-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Furthermore, the Court identifies no case in which we have upheld a
regulatory claim of frustration-of-purposes implied conflict pre-emption based
on nothing more than an expostadministrative litigating position and inferences
from regulatory history and final commentary. The latter two sources are even
more malleable than legislative history. Thus, when snippets from them are
combined with the Court's broad conception of a doctrine of frustration-ofpurposes pre-emption untempered by the presumption, a vast, undefined area of
state law becomes vulnerable to pre-emption by any related federal law or
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variety of considerations that the Department of Transportation conducted before
it adopted FMVSS 208.294
Later that same term, the Court's opinion in another preemption case, involving
regulation of foreign affairs, is telling:
Even without an express provision for preemption, we have found
that state law must yield to a congressional Act in at least two
circumstances. When Congress intends federal law to "occupy the
field," state law in that area is preempted. .

.

.And even if

Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally
preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute. 295
The Court defines a sufficient "conflict" as "a matter ofjudgment, to be informed
by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifyring its purpose and intended
effects.

296

For this proposition, the Court quotes Savage v. Jones,297 a case finding

preemption under the original Food and Drug Act and decided in 1912 during a
time when the Court applied an expansive preemption doctrine. z9 '
In the two years since Geier, the Court has re-written the preemption
presumption in the negative, as "an assumption of non-preemption" that is not
triggered in areas of significant federal presence. 29 9 The Court has placed very
limited reliance on express preemption provisions, 3" and firmly placed the weight
of preemption analysis in the arms of obstacle implied preemption.3"
Geierrepresents a seismic shift in the Court's preemption doctrine. The Court
has returned preemption doctrine to its early focus on federal exclusivity and turned
away from any meaningful attempt at discerning congressional intent that has been
regulation.
Id.
294. Id. at 874-86.
295. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (explaining that Massachusetts' Burma law was impliedly preempted by foreign
affairs power and congressional Burma Act) ( relying on Charleston & W. Carolina R.R. Co. v.
Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915)). The Court recogi'zed that "the categories of
preemption are not 'rigidly distinct."' Id. at 372 n.6 (citation omitted).
296. Id. at 373.
297. 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
298. For a discussion of Savage v. Jones, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
299. U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (involving preemption of state policies regarding
Burma; foreign affairs exclusively federal; preemption found).
300. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (applying the express
preemption provision of the cigarette labeling laws again and expressly preempting state advertising
regulations).
301. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,543-44 (2001) (finding
that the MDA impliedly preempted the plaintiffs fraud claim based on the defendant's
misrepresentations to the FDA to obtain device approval). In Buclanan, the Court found that policing
fraud against federal agencies is hardly "'a field which the States have traditionally occupied"' to
warrant any preemption presumption. Id. at 347 (citation omitted). The Court applied implied obstacle
preemption, relying on Geier and not Medtronic, and concluded that the MDA express preemption
provision was not exclusive. Id. at 352-53.
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"the ultimate touchstone" of preemption analysis since the 1940s. Preemption
analysis is now organized not only to prefer federal law, but to presume its
operation to the exclusion of state law that has even a minimal effect on the
accomplishment of federal objectives.
B. Old Meets New: The Presumptionin FavorofPreemption
The foregoing discussion of almost one hundred years of preemption cases
suggests some important conclusions. First, there is no meaningful presumption
against preemption. Others have suggested as much; the case analysis just
concluded confirms it. In a very few cases in the 1970s and 1980s there was a
glimmer that the presumption might be given some content, but that position was
never strongly held and has certainly not carried the day. The focus on preserving
areas of traditional state authority has given way to a focus on promoting federal
authority and uniformity.
Second, over the years, the Court has consistently applied implied preemption
doctrine broadly to support a finding of preemption. Early cases did so
unabashedly, with no real concern for congressional intent, as a means of giving
content and strength to the early congressional attempts to regulate commerce.2
Later cases did so under the rubric of seeking congressional intent, as a means of
balancing the federal/state interests at stake at a time of increasing federal
legislative activity. 3 More recent cases did so as an accommodation of the
perceived national needs expressed in the comprehensive consumer protection
legislation of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. 304 It was only in the 1980s that skepticism,
and perhaps frustration, took over as apossible reaction to the significant and everwidening national control over so many aspects of our daily lives. At this time, with
cases like Silkwood, Ouellette, and then to an extent in Cipollone,the Court seemed
to be trying to give content to the states' continuing authority in traditional areas of
health and safety, particularly by focusing on congressional intent in a more narrow
way through express preemption provisions.0 5 But that time in the30 6life of
preemption doctrine was short lived, as evidenced by the result in Geier.
Third, express preemption provisions now are read broadly to preempt, though
the Court says it is reading such provisions neutrally. If they cannot be read to
preempt, they will be read narrowly to permit implied obstacle preemption to
operate broadly to preempt. This conclusion stems directly from the Court's
application of the preemption provision and savings clause in Geier. 7 This
combination ofpreemption rules leads to the application of an implicit presumption
in favor of preemption.

302. See supranotes 24-46 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part II.C.

304.
305.
306.
307.

See supranotes 88-194 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts II.D-E.
See supraPart lI.F.
See supra Part lI.F.
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Fourth, there appears no meaningful way to overcome the presumption in favor
of preemption, at least not as applied to state common law damages actions. Absent
pellucidly clear evidence of congressional desire not to preempt such actions, the
history of the Court's cases suggest it will find implied obstacle preemption.
The final element of the preemption learning is the most important. Explaining
the Court's return in the late 1990s to a focus on the amorphous, unpredictable,
impossible to duplicate implied obstacle preemption analysis, after such a relatively
short time focusing on congressional intent under express preemption analysis,
deserves some attention. In fact, the historical analysis suggests that implied
obstacle preemption has always served a basic default function-when all other
preemption doctrines seemed inapplicable, implied obstacle preemption served as
a catch-all to preserve federal law's supremacy. The next section explores the
explanations and justifications that might exist to support the Court's current focus
on implied obstacle preemption doctrine.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PREEMPTION

In the perfect world of preemption doctrine, where congressional intent really
matters, there would be a presumption against preemption of historically state
governed matters that required clear and convincing proof of congressional intent
to rebut because of the federal nature of our system of government. The
interpretation of express preemption provisions would be exclusive as a result; if
Congress wanted to clarify the scope of those preemption provisions after ajudicial
determination of preemption, it could do so.3"8 An express preemption provision

would be interpreted, first, based on its language; second, with a view to the history
and purpose of the statute; and, finally, with insight from legislative policy.0 9
Implied preemption doctrines only based on occupation of the field and actual
conflict would operate absent an express preemption provision. Support for this
articulation of preemption doctrine comes from an interest in the displacement of
few, if any, common law tort actions based on the need for the oversight ofthe tort
system in defining responsible behavior. 0

308. Contra Main R. Scordato, FederalPreemption ofState Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAvIs L.
REv. 1,28-29 (2001) ("It is unacceptable to create a system that essentially requires Congress or a
federal agency to constantly monitor potential state law obstacles to legitimate federal objectives and
amend the relevant preemption language accordingly.").
309. See Ausness, supra note 3, at 240-52 (discussing elements of a model of statutory
interpretation of federal regulation for preemption purposes which includes an evaluation of text,
history, and legislative policy).
310. I agree with the following statement of Judge Jack Weinstein:
The American tradition of "bottom-up" protection through initiative of the
injured and their lawyers by private law suits and a democratized litigation
process are, in my view, guarantees that need protection under tort law....
Preemption by regulation is a doctrine that makes me nervous in a world of
rapidly developing technological dangers and wonders.
Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND. L. Rnv. 1439, 1442 (2001);
see also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027,
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This perfect world does not exist. The Court has made it clear that the
regulatory effect ofcommon law tort actions is substantial, if not subversive.31 The
Court did not always take this position, but it does so today and can be expected to
continue.3" The Court is skeptical of the benefit of common law actions as a proper
element of a regulatory regime and enamored by federal regulatory uniformity and
the certainty and predictability for those regulated that comes with it.
While this Article has demonstrated that the Supreme Court is building modern
preemption doctrine on the exclusivity cases of the early part of the twentieth
century, it is important to note that a full-fledged return to that expansive
preemption doctrine is notyet occurringnor likely to occur. The Courtbacked away
from a blatantly expansive preemption doctrine in the 1940s as it became clear that
to continue with such a doctrine would totally annihilate the operation of an
enormous amount of state laws of avery wide variety, aresult certainly inconsistent
with the intent of any Congress legislating at the time. The Supreme Court,
conscious at the time of the power of broadly defined preemption doctrine, sought
a way to balance its obligation to further congressional objectives and to preserve
the proper role of state authority. It chose the vehicle of defining congressional
intent as the balancing mechanism.
The Supreme Court's recent preemption cases evidence a federal law
preference very much like those early cases, but they do not evidence a wholesale
return to that expansive preemption doctrine which would find preemption as a
result of the very existence of federal regulation in a field. Instead, the Court
evaluates the federal regulations presented to it broadly as topurposeto further the
presumption of preemption in the particular case before it, but not broadly as to
scope so that all state laws imaginably within the scope of those regulations are
captured. In this way, the Court furthers its desire to promote federal uniformity of
regulation in a wide array of circumstances but without obviously overstepping its
role in the hierarchy of law-making authority. The Court, conscious of its role in
this hierarchy, would naturally feel uneasy with a doctrine that overtly permits it to
broaden so significantly the scope of federal regulation absent a finding of

1064-68 (1990) (discussing industry capture of agency charged with regulating the industry); Peter
L. Kahn, Regulation andSimple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspectiveon TortReform, 72 N.C.L. Rnv.
1129, 1182-84 (1994) (arguing that administrative agencies have limited resources available to
properly and fully police product risks within their scope); Nader & Page, supra note 263, at 435
(discussing concern that agencies can be captured by regulated industry); Teresa Moran Schwartz,
The Role ofFederalSafety Regulations in ProductsLiabilityActions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 114748 (1988) (discussing industry control of information needed by agency to regulate effectively
hampers agency decision-making process). For a consideration of the proper role, see generally
Richard C. Ausness, The Case For a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REv.
1210, 1237-38 (1996) (discussing failures of preemption as method of promoting product safety).
311. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) ("As a practical
matter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of50 States' tort regimes
will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants-burdens not contemplated by
Congress in enacting the FDCA and the MDA.").
312. See discussion of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra notes 71-87 and
accompanying text, and discussion of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra Part I.D.
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congressional intent to preempt.
A. The Needfor Uniformity
The perceived need for uniformity of standards is, and has always been, a
critical factor to the Court in evaluating whether a state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of federal objectives. The Court has found obstacle
preemption in a wide variety of cases over the years and relies for this conclusion
on its fear of inhibiting the regulatory scheme that Congress has devised to achieve
national uniformity.
The Court relied on the need for uniformity in regulating railroad liability in
Winfield when it found implied preemption of state damages actions under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act in 1917.313 The Court relied predominantly on the
need for national uniformity of warehouse regulations in Rice,314 even though the
federal legislation was directed to a narrow category of warehouses. The Court
relied on the need for national uniformity in Garmon when it concluded that state
damages actions were preempted under the NLRA even though the legislation left
significant room for the states to regulate labor relations." 5 The Court relied on the
national need for uniformity of debt relief in Perezwith little analysis ofthe federal
regulation in issue on that need. 16 The Court relied on the need for national
uniformity in admiralty, a traditionally federally regulated subject, when it rejected
state wrongful death actions operating concurrently with the federal statutory action
in Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire.317
In a very few cases has the Court not found the need for national uniformity of
regulation to support implied obstacle preemption. Silkwood1 8 and Ouellette1 9 in
the 1980s did not find implied obstacle preemption in two areas traditionally
federally regulated, nuclear energy generation and clean water preservation,
respectively. These cases stand out as the watershed of support for the preservation
of state law, but now must be seen as anachronistic. After its foray into seeking
congressional intent by interpreting express preemption provisions, the Court
returned with a vengeance to implied obstacle preemption in Geier?20 where the

313. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1917); see discussionsupra notes
35-46 and accompanying text. See generallyGary T. Schwartz, Consideringthe ProperFederalRole
in American Tort Law, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 917, 920-21 (1996) (discussing the Court's expansion of
liability under the FELA).
314. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,234-235 (1947); see discussion supranotes
55-70 and accompanying text.
315. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240,244; see discussion supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
316. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-56 (1971); see discussion supranotes 119-29and
accompanying text.
317. 477 U.S. 207, 217-33 (1986); see discussionsupranotes 172-74 and accompanying text.
318. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); see discussion supranotes 145-70
and accompanying text.
319. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see discussionsupra notes 175-83 and
accompanying text.
320. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); see discussion supraPart HI.A.
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perceived need for national uniformity was discerned not from the legislation itself
but from the administrative scheme which it fostered.
Geierinvolved a very specific federal standard which was held to establish the
need for national uniformity to accomplish the standard's goal. More general
standards have been held sufficient to impliedly preempt as well,"' so it is not just
the specificity of the federal standard that matters but whether it supports generally
a need for national uniformity. That federal regulators have regulated at all would
seem sufficient to wrap the subject in the cloak of "nationalism." 3 Whenever
Congress has legislated, and a federal administrative agency acted under that
legislation, one can argue that the purpose is "national" in nature and, therefore,
state law is preempted. The presumption in favor of preemption identified in this
Article is supported by this focus on the need for national uniformity that underpins
implied obstacle preemption.
B. The Questfor Certainty
The Court's preemption doctrine and its silently operating presumption in favor
of preemption is explained primarily by the Court's focus on a perceived need for
national uniformity in the areas analyzed. Other explanations exist which are not
based on the substantive subject matter regulated but on external factors. These
influences operate naturally in the background ofpreemption doctrine, but they are
not the central explanations with which this Article deals. One such explanation,
however, is based on the Justices politics-the Justices are, for the most part,
conservative and their conservatism is more fiercely directed againststate tort law
than for notions of federalism.3" Another explanation is found in the social and
cultural environment in which preemption cases arise. The onslaught in the late
1980s and 1990s ofreports about excessive tort liability andrun-awayjury verdicts,
however accurate or inaccurate, influenced society in ways we may not fully
appreciate. If one were inclined not to trust the assessment of liability by juries, one
might be very inclined not to trust juries after reports of irrational, unpredictable,
and unreasonable litigation results.
The Court favors the value of certainty and predictability that results from a
uniform federal rule over the value of preserving traditional state authority in our
federal system at least as those values are implicated in preemption cases.
Uniformity and the certainty that stems from it, for its own sake, of course, does
not, as a principle operating alone, produce just or fair substantive results. We must

321. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (applying federal railroad
warning standards to preempt state common law damages actions based on a failure to warn).
322. See Garmon,359 U.S. at 244 ("[Rlegardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to
control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of
national purposes.").
323. See Spence & Murray, supra note 13, at 1128-29 (discussing effect of ideology and
politics on preemption decisions); see also Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson I, Federalismfor the Future,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 523, 536 (2001) ("[T]he course of modern jurisprudence has placed the states at
the mercy of the Supreme Court.").
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assume, however, that federal legislators and administrators act in good faith in the
legislation and regulation they define. We must also assume, though, that they act
within limits imposed on the legislative and administrative system-limits born of
time pressures, heavy work loads, restricted sources of information, political
influences and desires, and personal influences and desires.324 Understanding the
limits of legislative and regulatory decision-making, the Court has nonetheless
chosen to exalt certainty and uniformity of regulation over a more balanced
approach to accommodating state laws in the regulated areas. 3z
The benefits of certainty, therefore, require elaboration. For entities subject to
federal regulation, the certainty that results from knowing that federal rules will
govern over state rules, even where they do not actually conflict or, indeed, might
be complementary, will have beneficial effects. Those entities will not need to
consider state rules governing conduct in deliberation over choices in conduct. In
areas of doubt, the regulated entities can, with a high degree of certainty, ignore the
state law principles without fear of state sanction, damages liability, or other
interference.
Those subject to federal regulation will know that the federal regulation in
issue, whether seat belt design features, pesticide-warning labeling, hazardous
material transportation regulations, or what have you, defines exclusively the
standard to be achieved. The certainty that comes from that knowledge will permit
those entities the freedom to forgo the struggle over whether to do something more,
or different, than what the federal regulations require.
Whether product manufacturers ever do more than federal regulations require
is unlikely. What they do have to do, however, is pay damages to tort plaintiffs in
some cases, though by no means all, based on a failure to comply with a state
common law standard of reasonable care of product defectiveness that required a
different choice. The certainty that will come to product manufacturers from
knowing they will not have to pay those damages will result in a decrease both in
the expenses from damages liability and also in the expenses attributed to
determining what level of tort liability must be anticipated, because none need be
anticipated absent violation ofa federal standard. Similarly, the expense of litigating
some percentage of the cases that challenge the conduct of those subject to the
federal regulation will be reduced as some potential plaintiffs simply choose to
forego seeking tort liability because ofthe enormous likelihood that preemption will
result. Fewer lawyers will take those cases because of the enormous likelihood of
defeat on preemption. No tort damages will need to be considered by the companies

324. See Ausness, supra note 3, at 236-38 (discussing purposivist approach to statutory
interpretation, assuming legislators act reasonably; contrasting recent scholarship which suggests
legislators action is based on interest group and election-seeking purposes which influence them);
Scordato, supra note 308, at 22-29 (discussing limits on legislative process and need for preserving
ability to compromise on legislative and administrative content as affecting preemption analysis).
325. See Schwartz, supranote 313, at 924-32 (explaining the need for uniformity and certainty
in products liability and providing a balanced view of need for uniformity in products liability cases,
which "seems huge," with the benefits from having such nonuniformity which, though confusing,
produces benefits in product safety).
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subject to the regulation as a cost of theirproducts because the job of balancing the
issues that would be raised in a tort action presumably will have been done by the
administrators. The question of whether the job was done adequately, will, of
course, not be reached.
Fewerplaintiffs will receive compensation. Potentiallyno plaintiffs will receive
compensation, as a result of the regulated conduct. The compensation for injuries
suffered as a result of the regulated conduct will be borne by the plaintiffs, their
families, their employers, their health care providers and their health insurers, and
the government if they are not able to cover their own expenses.
Persons injured by regulated conduct can also prevail on their legislators to
address the wide preemptive effect of the Court's doctrine. Injured plaintiffs,
through consumer, employer, or other interested organizations, can lobby their
legislators as to specific legislation, or in general, regarding the wide preemptive
effect of federal legislation and regulation. I recognize the unlikelihood of this
result-injured plaintiffs rarely collect to effect change, but consumer groups and
other "watchdog" agencies do. Encouraging people to engage the democratic
process is a good byproduct of an unpopular legal doctrine.
Certainty ofpreemption may benefit our administrators. If the presumption in
favor ofpreemption is seen for what it is, administrators will, it is hoped, consider
the irrelevance of the tort damages system in regulating the conduct or product
condition in issue. Administrators can choose to define the preemptive effect of
their regulations, and this choice may likely influence the Court in its assessment
of the preemptive effect of the regulation.326 Administrators are considered to have
the kind of expertise to regulate that lay persons do not 32 7 and are therefore relied
upon by the Court for the use of that expertise in regulating. If administrators are
knowledgeable about the presumption in favor of preemption and the certainty that
will result, they may be inclined to consider the effect of reduced tort liability on
the balance being struck regarding the product design or conduct choices of which
they are in charge. If administrators do not consider themselves to be only one of
the elements in a system of regulating conduct, but indeed the only element in that
system, they may take a different view of the nature, and significance, of their task.
Certainty of preemption will benefit our legislators who may or may not know,
nor pay attention to, how legislation is being treated preemptively. To articulate a
legal doctrine, like the presumption against preemption, and then never give it
content nor pay it heed is, at the very least, misleading to the legislators who may
be relying on the Court to interpret and apply legislation based on it. Misleading our
legislators into thinking their legislative action is presumed not to unnecessarily
affect state authority is at least a hindrance to the legislative process.
On the other hand, requiring subsequent legislators to pay attention to the
everlasting affects of their own legislation, much less prior legislation, would seem
to be an unreasonable task to require of legislators. Consequently, unmasking the
326. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (discussing whether to give deference
to federal administrators' view of preemptive effect of their regulations).
327. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-84 (2000).
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presumption in favor of preemption may educate legislators with the knowledge of
the wide preemptive scope of their legislation. The knowledge that any state laws
that may conflict with the federal laws in future years will be preempted is powerful
knowledge. Disabusing legislators of the notion that preemption is not presumed
may increase the likelihood that legislators will try to write the clear, unambiguous
preemption provision that will alter the presumption. If Congress wants to write a
clear and unambiguous express preemption provision to prevent this result, it can
do so. The Court will, of course, require a clarity of language heretofore unseen,
and perhaps not known to humankind, but anything is possible. Recent Congresses
have adopted preemption provisions based on implied obstacle preemption, thus
endorsing that doctrine as they understand it.328 This result would seem to suggest
that Congress will continue to defer to the Court's defaultpreemption position and,
indeed, endorse it. It is particularly important, therefore, that the Court's
presumption in favor of preemption be disclosed.
Finally, some commentators have suggested that the Court's preemption
doctrine can be explained, and thus reconciled, by recognizing that the Court will
apply statutory-interpretation principles to the various federal legislation without
trying to follow any categorization of preemption cases.329 It does not appear,
however, that the Court applies its typical statutory interpretation model to these
cases, as the discussion of Cipollone, Medtronic, and Geier suggests. Such an
approach has some merit330 but it is not, in fact, what the Court is doing, nor what
it should do.
The Court has taken a significant number of preemption cases in recent years,
and it is possible that the Court will interpret each statute sui generis.Such a result,
though unlikely, would increase the unpredictability and uncertainty of preemption
doctrine even more than already exists. It would also make the resolution of cases
raising the preemption issue enormously expensive and protracted. Every case
raising preemption would have to await resolution by the Court. Cases will take
forever to resolve as the lower and appellate courts try to analyze each statute on
its own merits, knowing that the Supreme Court will analyze the statute in its own
way regardless. The parties will have no repose; litigants under similar statutes will
have no certainty in the preemption analysis of the lower courts, and the parties will
have no faith in the resolution of their cases. Like cases will not be treated alike
until the Court answers the preemption issue as to each regulatory scheme. The

328. See Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5125(a)(2) (1994) (noting that
a requirement of a State is preempted if the "requirement... as applied or enforced, is an obstacle to
accomplishing and carrying out this chapter or a regulation prescribed under this chapter"). This
statute also includes provisions for publishing preemption determinations by the Secretary of
Transportation and judicial review of those preemption decisions. Id. § 5125(d), (f).
329. See Scordato, supra note 308, at 31 (rejecting reliance on express preemptions or
presumption against preemption and advocating case specific statutory interpretation to define scope
of preemption of federal statutes); Dinh, supranote 3, at 2111-12 (advocating contextual preemption

analysis).
330. See Ausness, supra note 3, at 234-51 (advocating a model of statutory interpretation in
preemption cases based on the Eskridge-Frickey "practical reasoning" model).
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Court is unlikely to want to continue struggling with these cases in such a way and
is more likely to try implementing a preemption doctrine that will prevent it. The
presumption in favor of preemption, coupled with a showing of need for national
uniformity or national presence in the field, is more suited to apply broadly to a
wide variety of federal regulation.
V. APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PREEMPTION
The Court's refusal in Geier to "distinguish among types of federal-state
conflicts" and its significant concern about the legal uncertainty that results from
such conflicts, coupled with its disregard for the presumption against preemption,
leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Court has moved full scale away from
seeking congressional intent to preempt toward presuming intent to preempt. This
Part describes how the Court's presumption in favor of preemption may operate
within the context of the Court's preemption doctrine.
A. Defining the Operationof the PresumptionAgainst Preemption
The easy answer, of course, is that the Court will find preemption, particularly
of common law tort actions, regardless of the preemption provision and the federal
regulation in issue. The result in Geier, in the face of both an express preemption
provision and a savings clause, supports such a conclusion. The Court continues to
apply a limited express preemption doctrine, but, when preemption is not found
under that doctrine, "actual conflict" preemption operates as a default position. The
flexibility of the Court's "actual conflict" preemption, including as it does the
amorphous obstacle preemption, would seem to support a finding of preemption in
virtually all circumstances. There may be circumstances where federal preemption
is not supported, even by the Court's very liberal application of that doctrine, but
those circumstances are likely to be rare.
The presumption in favor of preemption is not an evidentiary presumption that
one party need rebut and the other support. Rather, the Court, presuming
preemption silently, seeks some support for the conclusion that federal law prevails
over state law under the circumstances of the particular federal statute or regulation
in issue. The Court will find such support in one of two ways: (1) a showing of
need for national uniformity of regulation in the particular field, or (2) a showing
of historic federal presence inthe field, regardless of a need for national uniformity.
Neither of these bases of support require a showing of congressional intent to
preempt. The required showing need be only a minimal level of benefit from a
nationally uniform regulation on the subject in issue, or a minimum level of prior
federal presence in the field. Upon finding support in one of the two defined ways,
the presumption has been supported and operates to preempt.
What is the minimum showing of need for uniformity or federal presence in the
field necessary to support the presumption in favor of preemption? This question
remains to be answered, but the answer canbe predicted with some accuracy. Based
on Geier, in which a temporary regulation resulting from political compromises
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with the regulated industry was sufficient to support the need for national
uniformity to support preemption, very little in the way of uniformity would seem
necessary to support the presumption. The Court has considered the mere existence
of a federal agency to regulate medical devices, with no showing of that agency's
efforts to prevent fraud and misrepresentation by the regulated industry, enough of
"
a federal presence to support preemption of fraud-on-the-agency claims.33
' These
cases suggest, consistent with the Court's early preemption cases, that a minimal
showing of need for uniformity or federal presence in the field will suffice.
Many federal statutory schemes remain to be interpreted by the Supreme Court
as to their preemptive effect. Lower courts routinely struggle with attempting to
follow the Supreme Court's "moving target" preemption doctrine, and the
inevitable result is a split among the courts, state and federal, as to the preemptive
scope of federal legislation.33 A small sample of such legislation affecting products
liability matters includes the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act;333 the
Consumer Product Safety Act;334 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act;335 the Flammable Fabrics Act;33 6 and the Federal Boat Safety
Act.337 All of these statutes contain an express preemption provision which permits
only state regulations that are "identical" to the applicable federal regulations, as did
the statute at issue in Geier.33' The language of these statutes is similar in that the
state regulation is allowed if it is "identical to" the federal regulation, or if the state
regulation is not "different from or in addition to" the federal regulation.339

331. Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2000).
332. For a discussion of the split among the courts regarding the scope of preemption under the
Federal Boat Safety Act, see infra Part V.B. For another collection identifying the federal statutes that
may be the subject of preemption analysis, see 2 MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCrs LIABILITY, supra
note 171, ch 28; see also Ausness, supra note 3, at 200-34.
333. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
334. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000).
335. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
336. Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (2000).
337. Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4302-4311 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
338. National Transportation and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).
339. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) ("Such State shall
not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required under this sub-chapter."); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1203 ("[N]o State
or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect a flammability standard...
unless the State or political subdivision standard or other regulation is identical to the Federal
standard or other regulation."); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) ("[N]o State or
political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish or to continue in effect any
provision of a safety standard or regulation which prescribes any requirements.., which are designed
to deal with the same risk of injury ... unless such requirements are identical to the requirements of
the Federal standard."); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 379r(a) ("[N]o State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect any requirement.., that is different from
or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with, a requirement under this [Act]."); Federal
Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 4306, ("[A] State may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law
or regulation establishing a recreational vessel ...

regulation prescribed under § 4302 of this title.").

safety standard ...

that is not identical to a
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B. Applying the Presumptionto the FederalBoat Safety Act
This section of the Article thus applies the Court's current preemption analysis
to one piece of federal legislation that needs preemption analysis, the federal Boat
Safety Act (FBSA). 340 The Court granted certiorari in a

case 34 '

involving the

preemptive effect of the FBSA and so will soon be applying its current preemption
doctrine to it.
The FBSA was enacted in 1971 to "'improve boating safety by requiring
manufacturers to provide safer boats and boating equipment to the public through
compliance with safety standards to be promulgated by the Secretary of the
Department in which the Coast Guard is operating."' 342 A number of boating
accidents343prompted Congress to establish a coordinated national boating safety
program.
The FBSA vests in the Secretary of Transportation the power to create
regulations governing recreational boat design andperformance. 3' The preemption
provision forbids a State from establishing or enforcing a "law or regulation
establishing a recreational vessel or... other safety standard... that is not identical
to a regulation" under the Act.345 The Act has a savings provision which states:
"Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under
does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State
this chapter
34
law.
The legislation also establishes the National Boating Safety Advisory Council
to assist the Secretary in determining the need for the development of safety
standards. 47 In 1988, the Coast Guard directed the Advisory Council to study the
feasibility of, and need for, propeller guards on motor boats.34 The Advisory
Council conducted a study to determine whether recreational boats should be
required to include propeller guards.349 After studying the issue, the Advisory
Council recommended in 1989 that "'the U.S.
350 Coast Guard should take no
regulatory action to require propeller guards."'

340. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4302-4311 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2001).
341. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 757 N.E.2d 75,77 (Ill.
342. Id. at 78 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-248 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1331,1333).
343. S. Rep. No. 92-248 (1971), reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. 1331, 1334-35. The bill's purpose
is described in the Senate Report as a means "to provide safer boats and boating equipment to the
public through compliance with safety standards to be promulgated by the Secretary." Id. at 1333.
344. 46 U.S.C. § 4302.
345. Id. § 4306.
346. Id. § 4311(g).
347. Id. § 4302(c).
2001).
348. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 757 N.E. 2d 75, 78 (Ill.
349. Id.
350. See id.The letter from the Rear Admiral of the U.S. Coast Guard to the Advisory Council
stated the Coast Guard's conclusions: "The regulatory process is very structured and stringent
regarding justification. Available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of a
regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats." See also Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594, 596
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (stating the text of Admiral Nelson's letter to the Advisory Council).
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In products liability cases alleging motorboat design flaws resulting from an
unguarded propeller, defendant manufacturers have argued that the Coast Guard's
decision not to require propeller guards preempts common law damages actions
claiming the boats are defective in design without them.351 A number of courts have
analyzed the express preemption of the FBSA and applied implied preemption to
the Act as well.352 The regulation at issue in these cases is unlike those at issue in
prior preemption cases because the regulatory agency deliberately chose not to
regulate on the subject matter of the common law claims. The decision not to
require propeller guards is now thirteen years old.
Some lower courts have found the claims not to be expressly preempted.353 The
preemption provision says that states may not require standards that are not
identical to federal standards;35 4 it would be hard to conclude that a state standard
is not identical to a non-existent standard. As well, the savings clause, similar to the
one in Geier, states that compliance with a regulation under the statute does not
relieve a person from liability at common law.355 As in Geier, it is unlikely that the
Court will apply the express preemption provision and its savings clause to save all
common law actions generally, even though that would be a neutral and textual
reading of the language of the statute. Most lower court opinions analyzing the
FBSA after Geier have applied implied obstacle preemption analysis to find
preemption in these cases. This result is certainly consistent with Geier and its
application of implied obstacle preemption regardless of the presence of an express
preemption provision.
In Lady v. Neal GlaserMarine,Inc.,356 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that a plaintiffs products liability claims were impliedly preempted by the FBSA.357
The court of appeals looked closely at the history of the decision not to require
propeller guards.35 Consistent with Geier, it also countered plaintiffs arguments
that the presumption against preemption should prevail where the police power of
the state was involved. 359 The court found instead that since the "Coast Guard has
been presented with an issue, studied it, and affirmatively decided as a substantive
matter that it was not appropriate to impose a requirement" any different state
requirement was impliedly preempted. 36 As to the savings clause, which expressly
saves common law claims,36' the court cites Geier for the proposition that a savings
clause "precludes a broad reading of the express preemption provision," but the
351. Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 2000).
352. Id. at 601-02 (citing many courts that have considered this issue).
353. Id.
354. Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
355. Id. § 4311(g).
356. 228 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2000).
357. Id. at 602.
358. Id. at 602-06.
359. Id. at 606-08.
360. Id. at 615.
361. Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 4311 (g) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("Compliance with
this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person
from liability at common law or under State law.").
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savings clause
"'does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption
362
principles."
The Supreme Court is preparing to review Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,363 in
which the Illinois Supreme Court found that while the plaintiff's common law
claims were not expressly preempted, they were impliedly preempted.3 4 Plaintiff,
of course, argued in favor of the presumption against preemption, particularly
where, as here, there is no federal regulation in issue to preempt the state common
law rules.365 Mercury argued that the presumption does not operate at all where
there 66has been a tradition of federal regulation, such as that regarding maritime
3
law.
The court decided that the federal interests at stake dictated thatno presumption
against preemption should apply.367 As to whether the statute expressly preempted
the plaintiff's claims, the court found that when one considers both the preemption
provision and the savings clause together, it becomes clear that Congress did not
intend to expressly preempt plaintiff's claims. 36' As to implied preemption,
however, the court noted that a savings provision does not save a common law
claim from implied preemption.3 69 After closely investigating the Coast Guard's
decision not to require manufacturers to install propeller guards, the court
concluded that "the Coast Guard's failure to promulgate a propeller guard
requirement here equates to a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate pursuant
to the policy ofthe FBSA. ' '370 It found thatthe plaintiff's common law claims were,
therefore, preempted as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives.371
When it reviews Sprietsma, the Supreme Court will apply the express
preemption provision, together with the savings clause, to conclude that some
claims are preempted but some are saved. Because express preemption does not
cover the entire scope of preemption, the Court will move on with little hesitation

362. Lady, 228 F.3d at 610-11 (citation omitted); accord Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 757

N.E.2d 75,85-86 (Ill. 2001) (agreeing with preemption conclusion as inLady). But see Ard v. Jensen,
996 S.W.2d 594, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("Congress chose broad language. Had Congress wanted

to limit the type of common law claims to be allowed, it could have done so. We presume that
Congress intended what the ordinary meaning of it statutes' language conveys.").
363. Sprietsma, 757 N.E.2d 75 (11. 2001), cert.granted, 122 S.Ct. 917 (2002) (mem.); U.S.
Supreme CourtAgrees To HearPropellerGuardPreemption Case, 30 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP.
70(2002).
364. Sprietsma, 757 N.E.2d at 81-82, 85.

365. Id. atj9.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 80.
368. Id. at 80-82. The court noted that several state and federal courts have found express
preemption based on the provision in the FBSA. Id. at 81 (citing Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49
F.3d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 1995); Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F.Supp. 183, 186 (E.D.Cal.
1996); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D.Conn. 1993); Mowery v. Mercury
Marine, 773 F. Supp. 1012,1017 (N.D.Ohio 1991); Farmer v. Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562 (Ill.
App. CL-1992); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Mich. 1997)).

369. See id. at 82.
370. Sprietsma, 757 N.E.2d at 85.
371. Id. at 87.
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to apply its implied obstacle preemption analysis.
The Court will not refer to the presumption against preemption. If it refers to
any presumption, the Court may mention "an assumption of nonpre-emption" that
is not triggered in areas of significant federal presence.3 72 The area of significant
federal presence that will operate here is the maritime/admiralty area. The Court
will be persuaded by the historic federal preeminence in this area, as it was in
3 73
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire
regarding preemption of state wrongful
death actions under the Death on the High Seas Act.3 74 The Court there, in the face
of a savings clause, said it would be incongruous to permit "widely divergent state
law" when Congress sought uniformity in an "area where the federal interests are
primary.,375
The Court will derive additional support for finding implied obstacle
preemption from the administrative process that resulted in the Advisory Council's
recommendation against requiring propeller guards. The Court has been persuaded
by the thoroughness of agency review and expertise, in cases like Geier, and can
be expected to rely on that review and expertise to support the conclusion that
national uniformity of standards is a federal objective with which any contradictory
state laws conflict. The agency regulatory process, resulting as it did in a
recommendation against a standard, supports a need for national uniformity just as
much as a recommendation in favor of a standard. A contrary conclusion would
permit the tort standards of juries in fifty different states to define the appropriate
level of boating safety which the Court will find inconsistent with the desire for
certainty and predictability in the regulatory process.
Even though there is no specific federal standard in issue to evaluate in the boat
safety cases, the Court will nonetheless find support for implied obstacle
preemption. Beginning with Garmon, the Court has found implied obstacle
preemption even in the absence of federal regulation of the specific matter in issue.
In Garmon, the Court found that even in the absence of the NLRB's determination
that the bargaining-related conduct in issue was protected, state law affecting that
conduct was prohibited.376 The Court said, in support of its decision to preempt
common law actions under the labor laws, "[T]he failure of the Board to define the
legal significance under the Act of a particular activity does not give the States the
power to act. 3 77 In Garmon, it was not necessary to have a particular federal action

372.
trade with
373.
374.

U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (involving preemption of state policies regarding
Burma; foreign affairs exclusively federal; preemption found).
477 U.S. 207 (1986).
Id. at 227; see discussion supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.

375. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 229, 233.
376. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).

377. Id. at 246. The Court continued:
In the absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither
protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially
undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such activities are
subject to state jurisdiction .... The governing consideration is that to allow the
States to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation

involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy.
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to support implied preemption: the decision by the relevant administrative agency
to decline federal jurisdiction over the issue was enough. The Court, consistentwith
its more modem cases, reflected its fear of non-uniformity: "Our concern is with
delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from state regulation if national
policy is to be left [unchanged]. 375
The Court in Garmondealt with national labor policy, a very important subject
of the time in which national rules were considered paramount to achieve worker
protection. That level of overarching national importance is not needed, however,
under the Court's modem implied obstacle preemption analysis. Some lesser level
of need for uniformity will suffice. Geierinvolved a very specific standard that was
found to preempt based on a need for national unifornity regarding a subject much
less significant to the welfare of the general public-automobile passive restraint
design choice for manufacturers.379 Other cases have relied on more general

regulatory action to support a similar result.38
The Court may, but will not need to, refer to its earlier cases dealing with
detailed waterways and vessel regulations promulgated by the Coast Guard and
other agencies that were held to impliedly preempt state regulations.38 ' The Court's
earlier cases which reconciled state and federal regulations, finding some preempted
and others not, will not hold sway in the case of the regulatory effect of common
law damages actions. The Court is not persuaded of the positive value of common
law actions in regulating conduct and so, it can be concluded, will find implied
obstacle preemption here regardless of the non-existence of federal regulation.
Indeed, the Coast Guard's study of the issue, through the Advisory Council,
would suggest just the type of administrative balancing of issues which the Court
finds persuasive in finding obstacle preemption of potentially conflicting state
damages actions. The Advisory Council's action, thirteen years ago, however,
would seem limited in its usefulness as evidence of the need for national uniformity
on this issue today. The Coast Guard's failure to regulate since then will likely be
taken to imply continuing acquiescence in its earlier decision not to regulate.
Further, the national interest in uniformity of regulation of matters even tangentially
related to maritime commerce will likely be enough to support the presumption in

Id. (citing Charleston & W. Carolina R.R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597,604 (1912)).
378. Id. at 246.
379. See discussion supra Part III.A.
380. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanldin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (finding preemption based not
on a particular regulation of the railroad crossing warnings in issue, but rather on the spending of
federal funds to pay for the railroad crossing warning); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531
U.S. 341 (2001) (discussing that the need for flexibility in FDA regulatory scheme supported implied
obstacle preemption of plaintiffs' claims based on fraudulent representations to FDA to obtain
approval for medical device); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (holding that implied
preemption not found in case where federal regulations for truck brakes were never properly
promulgated; no evidence that federal regulators concluded that regulation was not appropriate).
381. U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding that assumption of non-preemption not
triggered when state regulates in area where there has been history of significant federal presence;
national maritime commerce in issue); Ray v. At. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (discussing
partial implied preemption of waterways regulations).
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favor of preemption.
The Federal Boat Safety Act may prove too easy a task for the Court's
presumption in favor of preemption. As it involves both an area of traditional
federal presence and a legislatively defined need for uniformity, the Court will have
little difficulty finding implied obstacle preemption even though there is no specific
federal regulation with which the state common law actions actually conflict. A
more difficult task may lie ahead for the Court's preemption doctrine in other fields
where the federal legislation has traditionally been found not to impliedly preempt
state damages actions. The Court's focus on national uniformity of regulation and
the certainty that comes with that national uniformity will, this Article predicts, be
broad enough to include other subjects as well. Product safety regulations under the
Consumer Product Safety Act are a subject of preemption confusion."' Regulations
under the FDA that do not involve medical devices have long been held not to
preempt state tort law actions," 3 but that conclusion must now be re-evaluated in
light of the Court's presumption in favor of preemption.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has studied the Court's preemption cases since the early twentieth
century in order to provide a comprehensive picture of that doctrine. The completed
picture shows a Court dedicated to preemption of state regulations, including
common law damages actions, from a very early time in the life of preemption
doctrine. The reasons for this dedication to preemption may differ depending on the
legal and social climate of the time, but one conclusion is inescapable: there is a
presumption in favor of preemption.
The Court's treatment of the express preemption provision provided some
recent support for the conclusion that the Court indeed was dedicated, as it has often
said, to seeking congressional intent and applying apresumption against preemption
in areas traditionally governed by the states. That time in the life of preemption
doctrine is over, as the Court's recent cases make clear. The Court may continue to
take cases involving preemption under the many remaining uninterpreted federal
statutes and regulatory schemes, but this Article suggests that it will not. Once the
Court concludes, as it is likely to do under the FBSA, that federal administrative
non-regulation impliedly preempts state common law actions, the Court's work will
likely be completed. The presumption in favor ofpreemption will have been applied

382. Compare Leipart v. Guardian Indus., Inc., 234 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding
no implied preemption under glass shower door standards), Hittle v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 149 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding state tort claims against lighter manufacturer not
preempted), and Colon v. BIC USA Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no
implied preemption under cigarette lighter standards), with Moe v. MTD Prods., 73 F.3d 179, 182-84
(8th Cir. 1995) (applying preemption through use of the Consumer Product Safety Act), and Frazier
v. Heckingers, 96 F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding implied preemption under power mower
standards).
383. See Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.,
642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981).
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to most aspects of preemption doctrine, from express preemption clauses, to no
preemption clauses, to savings clauses, to comprehensive administrative
regulations, to limited administrative regulations, and, finally to no administrative
regulations. There will not be anything else to cover."
The Court's prior efforts to determine the preemptive scope of congressional
legislation have presented persistent problems of consistency. Do express
preemption provisions control, or not? Do implied preemption principles apply? If
so, which ones, and how do they apply? What role does a presumption regarding
preemption play? Do we seek congressional intent, clearly and manifestly, in
implied preemption or not? Congress must rely, at some level, on the Court's
legislative interpretation methods and, indeed, probably counts on them to resolve
ambiguity that results from the difficult compromises that are inevitable in the
legislative process. There are many reasons why Congress might fail to speak
unambiguously to the preemptive scope of its legislation as regards common law
damages actions. One important reason is the difficulty of achieving compromise
on the policy choices inherent in such a conclusion. One more important reason is
that it does not have to because it can rely on the Court to do that work.
If the presumption in favor of preemption is unmasked for what it is, Congress
will have more clearly the information it needs to decide whether to rely on the
Court to do that important work. Persons affected by the federal preemption ofstate
common law actions will similarly have more accurate information to evaluate
whether to spend their resources fighting preemption in the courts or in the
legislature. When all the players in the preemption arena are informed of the true
rules, that the work of preemption is being done by a silently operating presumption
in favor of preemption, that information may prompt the players to spend their
resources where the most can be done to change that result.
Professor Gary Schwartz recognized the tension between the desire for a
vibrant state law tort system and the need for uniformity of product standards and
described well the conflict between those two desires:
Admittedly, the number and range of variations in products
liability doctrine from state to state does suggest the vitality of
decentralized decision making, a vitality that is enhanced by
federalism....
Still, at some point this process of intellectual experimentation
should produce whatever results it is capable of producing. The
time for such experimentation runs out, and the time arrives for
more mature and experienced decision making. After thirty years

384. Some have suggested that preemption doctrine may next be applied under federal common
law and the dormant Commerce Clause. See Dinh, supranote 3, at 2108-12. The Court has not yet
suggested that it will go so far as to find preemption of state law based on such notions. The thesis
of this Article, however, that the Court is returning to preemption doctrine based on latent exclusivity
of federal regulation, suggests that such a result may notbe far off. Perhaps the clarity ofdoctrine that
may result from unmasking the presumption in favor of preemption will prevent such overreaching.
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liability at the state level, that time has probably
with products
385
come.
It would appear that the Supreme Court wholeheartedly agrees with Professor
Schwartz' sentiment and finds that the time has come. The Supreme Court, desiring
national uniformity of standards in products liability and other tort matters, and not
able to achieve it through legislation, achieves it in the form of uniform regulation
through federal preemption. The Court does so by using a presumption in favor of
preemption, though it says something quite different.
Words have power. Words have power because they can clarify and illuminate,
but they can also obfuscate. If our legal rules are defined by words that do not
matter, we cannot understand them, apply them, teach them, or change them. If the
legal system does not help make rules clearer, we all suffer. This Article has
attempted to explain more clearly the rules that actually operate in the area of
federal preemption.

385. Schwartz, supra note 313, at 930 (footnote omitted).

